Showing posts with label economics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label economics. Show all posts

Friday, July 16, 2010

10 Reasons for Bullish Long Term View on China

The 19th and 20th century belonged to the UK and America respectively. Ten years into the 21st century, I am very confident this century will belong to Asia, in particular China if it plays its cards well. So far it has.

Wednesday, August 26, 2009

Interpreting the Crisis

Business Times, 26 Aug 2009

The events of last September and October exhibited some features of a classic panic

This is the second and final part of an excerpt of the speech by US Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's Annual Economic Symposium at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on Aug 21.

HOW should we interpret the extraordinary events of the past year, particularly the sharp intensification of the financial crisis in September and October? Certainly, fundamentals played a critical role in triggering those events. As I noted earlier, the economy was already in recession, and it had weakened further over the summer. The continuing dramatic decline in house prices and rising rates of foreclosure raised serious concerns about the values of mortgage-related assets, and thus about large potential losses at financial institutions. More broadly, investors remained distrustful of virtually all forms of private credit, especially structured credit products and other complex or opaque instruments.

At the same time, however, the events of September and October also exhibited some features of a classic panic, of the type described by (British economist and journalist Walter) Bagehot and many others.

A panic is a generalised run by providers of short-term funding to a set of financial institutions, possibly resulting in the failure of one or more of those institutions. The historically most familiar type of panic, which involves runs on banks by retail depositors, has been made largely obsolete by deposit insurance or guarantees and the associated government supervision of banks.

But a panic is possible in any situation in which longer-term, illiquid assets are financed by short-term, liquid liabilities, and in which suppliers of short-term funding either lose confidence in the borrower or become worried that other short-term lenders may lose confidence.

Although, in a certain sense, a panic may be collectively irrational, it may be entirely rational at the individual level, as each market participant has a strong incentive to be among the first to the exit.

Panics arose in multiple contexts last year. For example, many financial institutions, notably including the independent investment banks, financed a portion of their assets through short-term repo agreements. In repo agreements, the asset being financed serves as collateral for the loan, and the maximum amount of the loan is the current assessed value of the collateral less a haircut.

In a crisis, haircuts typically rise as short-term lenders attempt to protect themselves from possible declines in asset prices. But this individually rational behaviour can set off a run-like dynamic: As high haircuts make financing portfolios more difficult, some borrowers may have no option but to sell assets into illiquid markets. These forced sales drive down asset prices, increase volatility, and weaken the financial positions of all holders of similar assets, which in turn increases the risks borne by repo lenders and thus the haircuts they demand.

This unstable dynamic was apparent around the time of the near- failure of Bear Stearns in March 2008, and haircuts rose particularly sharply during the worsening of the crisis in mid-September.

As we saw last fall, when a vicious funding spiral of this sort is at work, falling asset prices and the collapse of lender confidence may create financial contagion, even between firms without significant counterparty relationships. In such an environment, the line between insolvency and illiquidity may be quite blurry.

Panic-like phenomena

Panic-like phenomena occurred in other contexts as well. Structured investment vehicles and other asset-backed programmes that relied heavily on the commercial paper market began to have difficulty rolling over their short-term funding very early in the crisis, forcing them to look to bank sponsors for liquidity or to sell assets.

Following the Lehman collapse, panic gripped the money market mutual funds and the commercial paper market, as I have discussed. More generally, during the crisis, runs of uninsured creditors have created severe funding problems for a number of financial firms. In some cases, runs by creditors were augmented by other types of 'runs' - for example, by prime brokerage customers of investment banks concerned about the funds they held in margin accounts. Overall, the role played by panic helps to explain the remarkably sharp and sudden intensification of the financial crisis last fall, its rapid global spread, and the fact that the abrupt deterioration in financial conditions was largely unforecasted by standard market indicators.

The view that the financial crisis had elements of a classic panic, particularly during its most intense phases, has helped to motivate a number of the Federal Reserve's policy actions.

Mr Bagehot instructed central banks - the only institutions that have the power to increase the aggregate liquidity in the system - to respond to panics by lending freely against sound collateral.

Following that advice, from the beginning of the crisis, the Fed (like other central banks) has provided large amounts of short-term liquidity to financial institutions. As I have discussed, it also provided backstop liquidity support for money market mutual funds and the commercial paper market, and added significant liquidity to the system through purchases of longer-term securities.

To be sure, the provision of liquidity alone can by no means solve the problems of credit risk and credit losses; but it can reduce liquidity premiums, help restore the confidence of investors, and thus promote stability. It is noteworthy that the use of Fed liquidity facilities has declined sharply since the beginning of the year - a clear market signal that liquidity pressures are easing and market conditions are normalising.

What does this perspective on the crisis imply for future policies and regulatory reforms? We have seen during the past two years that the complex interrelationships among credit, market, and funding risks of key players in financial markets can have far-reaching implications, particularly during a general crisis of confidence.

In particular, the experience has underscored that liquidity risk management is as essential as capital adequacy and credit and market risk management, particularly during times of intense financial stress. Both the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the US bank regulatory agencies have recently issued guidelines for strengthening liquidity risk management at financial institutions. Among other objectives, liquidity guidelines must take into account the risks that inadequate liquidity planning by major financial firms pose for the broader financial system, and they must ensure that these firms do not become excessively reliant on liquidity support from the central bank.

But liquidity risk management at the level of the firm, no matter how carefully done, can never fully protect against systemic events. In a sufficiently severe panic, funding problems will almost certainly arise and are likely to spread in unexpected ways. Only central banks are well positioned to offset the ensuing sharp decline in liquidity and credit provision by the private sector. They must be prepared to do so.

Systemwide approach

The role of liquidity in systemic events provides yet another reason why, in the future, a more systemwide or macroprudential approach to regulation is needed. The hallmark of a macroprudential approach is its emphasis on the interdependencies among firms and markets that have the potential to undermine the stability of the financial system, including the linkages that arise through short-term funding markets and other counterparty relationships, such as over-the-counter derivatives contracts. A comprehensive regulatory approach must examine those interdependencies as well as the financial conditions of individual firms in isolation.

Since we last met here, the world has been through the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression. The crisis in turn sparked a deep global recession, from which we are only now beginning to emerge.

As severe as the economic impact has been, however, the outcome could have been decidedly worse. Unlike in the 1930s, when policy was largely passive and political divisions made international economic and financial cooperation difficult, during the past year, monetary, fiscal and financial policies around the world have been aggressive and complementary.

Without these speedy and forceful actions, last October's panic would likely have continued to intensify, more major financial firms would have failed, and the entire global financial system would have been at serious risk. We cannot know for sure what the economic effects of these events would have been, but what we know about the effects of financial crises suggests that the resulting global downturn could have been extraordinarily deep and protracted.

Although we have avoided the worst, difficult challenges still lie ahead. We must work together to build on the gains already made to secure a sustained economic recovery, as well as to build a new financial regulatory framework that will reflect the lessons of this crisis and prevent a recurrence of the events of the past two years.

I hope and expect that, when we meet here a year from now, we will be able to claim substantial progress towards both those objectives.

Tuesday, August 25, 2009

Looking back at the Crisis

Business Times, 25 Aug 2009

Bernanke reflects on the events of the past year, the challenges they posed, the measures taken, and the lessons learnt

This is the first part of an excerpt of the speech by US Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's Annual Economic Symposium at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on Aug 21. The second and final part will appear tomorrow.

BY THE standards of recent decades, the economic environment at the time of this symposium one year ago was quite challenging. A year after the onset of the current crisis in August 2007, financial markets remained stressed, the economy was slowing, and inflation - driven by a global commodity boom - had risen significantly. What we could not fully appreciate when we last gathered here was that the economic and policy environment was about to become vastly more difficult.

One very clear lesson of the past year - no surprise, of course, to any student of economic history, but worth noting nonetheless - is that a full-blown financial crisis can exact an enormous toll in both human and economic terms. A second lesson - once again, familiar to economic historians - is that financial disruptions do not respect borders. The crisis has been global, with no major country having been immune.

History is full of examples in which the policy responses to financial crises have been slow and inadequate, often resulting ultimately in greater economic damage and increased fiscal costs. In this episode, by contrast, policymakers in the United States and around the globe responded with speed and force to arrest a rapidly deteriorating and dangerous situation. Looking forward, we must urgently address structural weaknesses in the financial system, in particular in the regulatory framework, to ensure that the enormous costs of the past two years will not be borne again.

September-October 2008: The crisis intensifies

When we met last year, financial markets and the economy were continuing to suffer the effects of the ongoing crisis. We know now that the National Bureau of Economic Research has determined December 2007 as the beginning of the recession. The US unemployment rate had risen to 53/4 per cent by July, about one percentage point above its level at the beginning of the crisis, and household spending was weakening.

Ongoing declines in residential construction and house prices and rising mortgage defaults and foreclosures continued to weigh on the US economy, and forecasts of prospective credit losses at financial institutions both here and abroad continued to increase. Indeed, one of the nation's largest thrift institutions, IndyMac, had recently collapsed under the weight of distressed mortgages, and investors continued to harbour doubts about the condition of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, despite the approval by the Congress of open-ended support for the two firms.

Notwithstanding these significant concerns, however, there was little to suggest that market participants saw the financial situation as about to take a sharp turn for the worse. For example, although indicators of default risk such as interest rate spreads and quotes on credit default swaps remained well above historical norms, most such measures had declined from earlier peaks, in some cases by substantial amounts.

And in early September, when the target for the federal funds rate was 2 per cent, investors appeared to see little chance that the federal funds rate would be below 13/4 per cent six months later. That is, this time last year, market participants evidently believed it improbable that significant additional monetary policy stimulus would be needed in the United States.

Nevertheless, shortly after our last convocation, the financial crisis intensified dramatically. Despite the steps that had been taken to support Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, their condition continued to worsen. In early September, the companies' regulator placed both into conservatorship, and the Treasury used its recently enacted authority to provide the firms with massive financial support.

Shortly thereafter, several additional large US financial firms also came under heavy pressure from creditors, counterparties, and customers. The Federal Reserve has consistently maintained the view that the disorderly failure of one or more systemically important institutions in the context of a broader financial crisis could have extremely adverse consequences for both the financial system and the economy. We have therefore spared no effort, within our legal authorities and in appropriate cooperation with other agencies, to avert such a failure.

The case of the investment bank Lehman Brothers proved exceptionally difficult, however. Concerted government attempts to find a buyer for the company or to develop an industry solution proved unavailing, and the company's available collateral fell well short of the amount needed to secure a Federal Reserve loan of sufficient size to meet its funding needs. As the Federal Reserve cannot make an unsecured loan, and as the government as a whole lacked appropriate resolution authority or the ability to inject capital, the firm's failure was, unfortunately, unavoidable. The Federal Reserve and the Treasury were compelled to focus instead on mitigating the fallout from the failure, for example, by taking measures to stabilise the triparty repurchase (repo) market.

In contrast, in the case of the insurance company American International Group (AIG), the Federal Reserve judged that the company's financial and business assets were adequate to secure an US$85 billion line of credit, enough to avert its imminent failure. Because AIG was counterparty to many of the world's largest financial firms, a significant borrower in the commercial paper market and other public debt markets, and a provider of insurance products to tens of millions of customers, its abrupt collapse likely would have intensified the crisis substantially further, at a time when the US authorities had not yet obtained the necessary fiscal resources to deal with a massive systemic event.

The failure of Lehman Brothers and the near-failure of AIG were dramatic but hardly isolated events. Many prominent firms struggled to survive as confidence plummeted. The investment bank Merrill Lynch, under pressure in the wake of Lehman's failure, agreed to be acquired by Bank of America; the major thrift institution Washington Mutual was resolved by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in an assisted transaction; and the large commercial bank Wachovia, after experiencing severe liquidity outflows, agreed to be sold. The two largest remaining free-standing investment banks, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, were stabilised when the Federal Reserve approved, on an emergency basis, their applications to become bank holding companies.

Nor were the extraordinary pressures on financial firms during September and early October confined to the United States: For example, on Sept 18, the UK mortgage lender HBOS, with assets of more than US$1 trillion, was forced to merge with Lloyds TSB. On Sept 29, the governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands effectively nationalised Fortis, a banking and insurance firm that had assets of around US$1 trillion.

The same day, German authorities provided assistance to Hypo Real Estate, a large commercial real estate lender, and the British government nationalised another mortgage lender, Bradford and Bingley. On the next day, Sept 30, the governments of Belgium, France, and Luxembourg injected capital into Dexia, a bank with assets of more than US$700 billion, and the Irish government guaranteed the deposits and most other liabilities of six large Irish financial institutions.

Soon thereafter, the Icelandic government, lacking the resources to rescue the three largest banks in that country, put them into receivership and requested assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and from other Nordic governments. In mid-October, the Swiss government announced a rescue package of capital and asset guarantees for UBS, one of the world's largest banks. The growing pressures were not limited to banks with significant exposure to US or UK real estate or to securitised assets. For example, unsubstantiated rumours circulated in late September that some large Swedish banks were having trouble rolling over wholesale deposits, and on Oct 13, the Swedish government announced measures to guarantee bank debt and to inject capital into banks.

The rapidly worsening crisis soon spread beyond financial institutions into the money and capital markets more generally. As a result of losses on Lehman's commercial paper, a prominent money market mutual fund announced on Sept 16 that it had 'broken the buck' - that is, its net asset value had fallen below US$1 per share. Over the subsequent several weeks, investors withdrew more than US$400 billion from so-called prime money funds.

Conditions in short-term funding markets, including the interbank market and the commercial paper market, deteriorated sharply. Equity prices fell precipitously, and credit risk spreads jumped. The crisis also began to affect countries that had thus far escaped its worst effects. Notably, financial markets in emerging market economies were whipsawed as a flight from risk-led capital inflows to those countries to swing abruptly to outflows.

The policy response

Authorities in the United States and around the globe moved quickly to respond to this new phase of the crisis. The financial system of the United States gives a much greater role to financial markets and to non-bank financial institutions than is the case in most other nations, which rely primarily on banks. Thus, in the United States, a wider variety of policy measures was needed than in some other nations. In the United States, the Federal Reserve established new liquidity facilities with the goal of restoring basic functioning in various critical markets. Together, these steps helped stem the massive outflows from the money market mutual funds and stabilise the commercial paper market.

During this period, foreign commercial banks were a source of heavy demand for US dollar funding, thereby putting additional strain on global bank funding markets, including US markets, and further squeezing credit availability in the United States.

To address this problem, the Federal Reserve expanded the temporary swap lines that had been established earlier with the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss National Bank, and established new temporary swap lines with seven other central banks in September and five more in late October, including four in emerging market economies. In further coordinated action, on Oct 8, the Federal Reserve and five other major central banks simultaneously cut their policy rates by 50 basis points.

The failure of Lehman Brothers demonstrated that liquidity provision by the Federal Reserve would not be sufficient to stop the crisis; substantial fiscal resources were necessary. On Oct 3, on the recommendation of the administration and with the strong support of the Federal Reserve, Congress approved the creation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, with a maximum authorisation of US$700 billion to support the stabilisation of the US financial system.

Markets remained highly volatile and pressure on financial institutions intense through the first weeks of October. On Oct 10, in what would prove to be a watershed in the global policy response, the Group of Seven (G-7) finance ministers and central bank governors, meeting in Washington, committed in a joint statement to work together to stabilise the global financial system. In particular, they agreed to prevent the failure of systemically important financial institutions; to ensure that financial institutions had adequate access to funding and capital, including public capital if necessary; and to put in place deposit insurance and other guarantees to restore the confidence of depositors.

In the following days, many countries around the world announced comprehensive rescue plans for their banking systems that built on the G-7 principles. To stabilise funding, during October, more than 20 countries expanded their deposit insurance programmes, and many also guaranteed non-deposit liabilities of banks. In addition, amid mounting concerns about the solvency of the global banking system, by the end of October, more than a dozen countries had announced plans to inject public capital into banks, and several announced plans to purchase or guarantee bank assets.

This strong and unprecedented international policy response proved broadly effective. Critically, it averted the imminent collapse of the global financial system, an outcome that seemed all too possible to the finance ministers and central bankers that gathered in Washington on Oct 10. However, although the intensity of the crisis moderated and the risk of systemic collapse declined in the wake of the policy response, financial conditions remained highly stressed.

For example, although short-term funding spreads in global markets began to turn down in October, they remained elevated into this year. And, although generalised pressures on financial institutions subsided somewhat, government actions to prevent the disorderly failures of individual, systemically significant institutions continued to be necessary. In the United States, support packages were announced for Citigroup in November and Bank of America in January. Broadly similar support packages were also announced for some large European institutions, including firms in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

Although concerted policy actions avoided much worse outcomes, the financial shocks of September and October nevertheless severely damaged the global economy - starkly illustrating the potential effects of financial stress on real economic activity. In the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of this year, global economic activity recorded its weakest performance in decades.

In the United States, real GDP plummeted at nearly a 6 per cent average annual pace over those two quarters - an even sharper decline than had occurred in the 1981-82 recession. Economic activity contracted even more precipitously in many foreign economies, with real GDP dropping at double-digit annual rates in some cases. The crisis affected economic activity not only by pushing down asset prices and tightening credit conditions, but also by shattering household and business confidence around the world.

In response to these developments, the Federal Reserve expended the remaining ammunition in the traditional arsenal of monetary policy, bringing the federal funds rate down, in steps, to a target range of zero to 25 basis points by mid-December of last year. It also took several measures to further supplement its traditional arsenal. In particular, on Nov 25, the Fed announced that it would purchase up to US$100 billion of debt issued by the housing-related GSEs and up to US$500 billion of agency-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities, programmes that were expanded substantially and augmented by a programme of purchases of Treasury securities in March.

The goal of these purchases was to provide additional support to private credit markets, particularly the mortgage market. Also, on Nov 25, the Fed announced the creation of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). This facility aims to improve the availability and affordability of credit for households and small businesses, and to help facilitate the financing and refinancing of commercial real estate properties.

The TALF has shown early success in reducing risk spreads and stimulating new securitisation activity for assets included in the programme. Foreign central banks also cut policy rates to very low levels and implemented unconventional monetary measures.

On Feb 10, Treasury Secretary Geithner and the heads of the federal banking agencies unveiled the outlines of a new strategy for ensuring that banking institutions could continue to provide credit to households and businesses during the financial crisis. A central component of that strategy was the exercise that came to be known as the bank stress test.

Under this initiative, the banking regulatory agencies undertook a forward-looking, simultaneous evaluation of the capital positions of 19 of the largest bank holding companies in the United States, with the Treasury committing to provide public capital as needed. The goal of this supervisory assessment was to ensure that the equity capital held by these firms was sufficient - in both quantity and quality - to allow those institutions to withstand a worse-than-expected macroeconomic environment over the subsequent two years and yet remain healthy and capable of lending to creditworthy borrowers.

This exercise, unprecedented in scale and scope, was led by the Federal Reserve in cooperation with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC. Importantly, the agencies' report made public considerable information on the projected losses and revenues of the 19 firms, allowing private analysts to judge for themselves the credibility of the exercise. Financial market participants responded favourably to the announcement of the results, and many of the tested banks were subsequently able to tap public capital markets.

Overall, the policy actions implemented in recent months have helped stabilise a number of key financial markets, both in the United States and abroad. Short-term funding markets are functioning more normally, corporate bond issuance has been strong, and activity in some previously moribund securitisation markets has picked up. Stock prices have partially recovered, and US mortgage rates have declined markedly since last fall.

Critically, fears of financial collapse have receded substantially. After contracting sharply over the past year, economic activity appears to be levelling out, both in the United States and abroad, and the prospects for a return to growth in the near term appear good.

Notwithstanding this noteworthy progress, critical challenges remain: Strains persist in many financial markets across the globe, financial institutions face significant additional losses, and many businesses and households continue to experience considerable difficulty gaining access to credit. Because of these and other factors, the economic recovery is likely to be relatively slow at first, with unemployment declining only gradually from high levels.

Saturday, August 8, 2009

THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS – IMPLICATIONS FOR ASIA

SPEECH BY DR TONY TAN KENG YAM, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, GOVERNMENT OF SINGAPORE INVESTMENT CORPORATION AT THE ANNUAL DINNER OF THE ECONOMIC SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE HELD ON THURSDAY, 6 AUGUST 2009 AT 8.00PM AT SWISSOTEL SINGAPORE

1. I would first like to thank the organisers for inviting me to speak at this year’s Economic Society of Singapore Dinner which is being held in conjunction with the Singapore Economic Review Conference. Well over 200 papers will be presented at the Conference, attesting to the breadth and richness of the discussions that took place today and will take place over the coming two days.

2. In 2008, the world went through an economic and financial crisis which was the most severe that we have faced in the last fifty years. What I will do in my speech this evening is first to provide an update on the crisis. I will then proceed to talk about the economic and financial outlook going forward and end with some thoughts on the implications and challenges the crisis poses for Asia.

Update on Crisis

3. First : An update on the crisis. There are signs that the global economy is stabilising after the shock late last year. The massive policy support provided by governments and central banks is beginning to work through the world’s economies. Confidence is returning and fears of a meltdown in global financial markets and banks have receded. The reaction to the stress tests of major US banks indicate that the markets believe that these banks, with the support of the US government, will be able to weather the economic storm and earn their way out of future prospective losses. This prognosis is far from certain but the markets have chosen to give the banks the benefit of the doubt. Reflecting this, one closely watched measure of confidence, the Treasury Euro Dollar (TED) spread, has recently declined to pre-Lehman levels. The normalisation in credit flows in turn is supporting the recovery in global industrial production.

4. The global growth recovery is being led by economies that are not leveraged and have room for large policy stimulus like China, Japan, India, and other Asian countries. So despite historic falls in real GDP growth in some countries over late last year and early this year – and therefore dismal growth rates for 2009 – the worst seems to be behind us in Asia. Asian Economies are now expected to see continued improvement through 2010.

5. The US and other major developed economies are also expected to register positive growth later this year. This may be augmented near term by inventory adjustment and pent up demand from extremely depressed spending and output levels. However, sustained OECD growth in 2010 and beyond has less visibility and is likely to be weak given de-leveraging headwinds in the key consumer, financial, and housing sectors that were at the center of this Great Crisis.

Global Economic Outlook

6. So, the good news is that we appear to have avoided a global depression. The global economy seems to be stabilising and is expected to recover, although slowly. Beyond this cyclical recovery, however, my sense is that the global economic and financial environment has changed in three important ways.

7. First, the developed world is likely to experience lower growth in the coming years. De-leveraging, de-risking, re-regulation and, on the margin, even some de-globalization are disrupting markets and dampening economies and could reverse some of the progress due to past liberalization, globalization, and reforms. At the same time, aging populations will increasingly be a drag on growth in the developed economies.

8. The bulk of the globalised banking system consisting of major banks in the US and key parts of Europe are likely to remain capital impaired and subject to greater regulation. In the US, the banking sector is being supported by massive policy intervention and will likely be stable enough to support sub-par growth of 1-2%. However, it may not be strong enough to support credit needed for a sustained robust growth significantly above 2%. This is likely also true for UK and parts of Europe with banking and real estate sector problems.

9. US household consumption is unlikely to be robust as spending is being undermined by weaker income prospects, high unemployment, falling house prices and the need for higher savings rate to maintain long run consumption and repay debt. Household de-leveraging is likely to take a number of years, keeping overall recovery muted. As if these headwinds were not enough, re-regulation, higher taxation, government intervention and the pressing need for medium term fiscal consolidation will also constrain growth in the developed world.

10. In particular, the unprecedentedly large peace-time increase in public debt for many OECD countries from around 50% to over 100% of GDP could eventually put significant upward pressure on real interest rate over the next 3-5 years, potentially crowding out private investment and dampening growth and risk asset valuations.

11. The severe impact of this crisis on employment, household wealth, and public finances also raises difficult political and policy challenges in the West, especially in the US and UK. In the short-term, how governments deal with the continuing crisis will be of the utmost importance. As the troubled US and Japanese recoveries in the 1930s and 1990s demonstrated, policy errors could dramatically change the global economic and financial outlook for the worse.

12. Longer-term, the already difficult trade-offs between populist measures and economic efficiency will become more acute. It will require considerable skill by policy makers to assuage widespread concerns over job security, income inequality, healthcare, retirement, and environmental issues while maintaining a dynamic and open economy.

13. The second major change in the global economic environment is increased risk of both deflation and inflation, reversing a three decade decline in inflation and growth volatility and hence macroeconomic uncertainty. The golden age for asset markets that some have called “the great moderation” looks to have ended.

14. Given the weak economic recovery, excess capacity and high unemployment are expected to keep inflation under control over the next few years. Indeed, deflation remains a significant near term risk given extremely weak labour markets and downward wage pressure. With prolonged stagnation in employment and income growth, a vicious self re-enforcing downward spiral could easily develop.

15. However, once the recovery is in train, risks are ironically tilted towards higher inflation. Reversing unprecedented quantitative easing will be challenging. Given high unemployment and the risk of stalling a nascent recovery, central banks may be tempted to accommodate higher inflation. Governments may also be tempted to deal with higher fiscal deficits and debt accumulated during the crisis via higher inflation.

16. The global supply of commodities and labour could turn less friendly towards low inflation. Continued growth and urbanization in huge emerging economies will put pressure on food and energy prices, natural resources, and the environment. In addition, the slowing pace of global labour supply expansion will increase inflationary headwinds. This is because towards the end of the next decade, the pace of industrialisation will eventually slowdown in China, while the capacity for other large emerging markets, such as India, to replace China’s contribution to global labour supply remains uncertain. At the same time, developed countries will start to see significant declines in their working-age populations.

17. The third major change in the global economic environment is the increasing importance of the emerging economies, anchored by China and India. Emerging economies should continue to grow relatively robustly notwithstanding OECD weakness. Emerging economies are expected to account for more than half of the world’s GDP growth over the next decade. In 2000, for instance, emerging markets accounted for 20% of global growth, but over the coming decade this is expected to rise to about 60%.

18. Emerging economies are likely to displace the G-7 as the world’s largest economies over the next 10-15 years, even if per capita incomes will still lag behind the developed economies. This relative outperformance will be driven by

(i) larger savings and domestic demand potential,
(ii) relatively healthy public and private sector balance
sheets,
(iii) policy flexibility, and
(iv) room for significant productivity catch-up.

The current Great Crisis has markedly accelerated such trends.

19. Medium-term prospects for China and India are positive, even as they face difficult structural challenges going forward. For China, this would include successfully rebalancing its growth drivers, dealing with resource constraints, meeting the aspirations of an increasingly richer population, and reforming a tightly controlled monetary, financial, and exchange rate system.

20. With its fiscal and ideological constraints, India is somewhat behind China in terms of urbanization and economic liberalization but faster progress may be possible with the recently elected government. In addition, at the regional level, some states have been markedly more progressive while the rise of a larger middle class may reduce pressures for more populist politics and increase pressure for economic reforms.

21. Beyond China and India, prospects vary across Asia. Countries that are more dependent on exports and capital inflows, have less healthy balance sheets, and have significant structural impediments such as political uncertainty will fare less well. By contrast, economies with large potential internal markets and which are also more complementary to China and India will benefit. These would include the Greater China and Indochina regions, and Indonesia.

22. But the shift in economic power to the emerging world will also likely increase geopolitical risks. For one, the emerging economies, especially the BRICs will become key global powers and increasingly demand more say on world affairs. An awkward transition is likely to occur: In terms of military power the US is likely to be dominant for decades to come, and will be called upon to carry out most of the heavy lifting in global trouble spots. However, the US would still be heavily dependent on foreign countries including key emerging geopolitical rivals, to finance its large public debt.

23. Conflicts could also arise over natural resources. Severe demand supply imbalances could lead to greater and more intense competition among nations for resources such as energy, arable land, and useful commodities. This could lead to higher commodity prices, or conflict, or both.

24. The future economic environment is thus fraught with higher macroeconomic, policy, and geopolitical risks. Growth is likely to be lower for a number of years given significant de-leveraging. Deflation risks are high in the near term with inflation risks rising in the longer term. The unprecedented peace-time increase in public debt in the developed countries especially the US and the UK will likely lead to significantly higher real interest rates which could dampen long-term growth. Global growth will recover, but will be skewed towards the emerging countries. The continued rise of emerging markets is positive but will bring increased geopolitical and inflationary risks.

Implications for Asia

25. What does this imply for Asia?

26. The first important implication is that, particularly for countries with large populations like China and India, Asia’s economic growth model will be re-oriented from depending largely on exports to a more balanced model that is dependent as much on domestic consumption as on export growth. Such rebalancing would be helpful in two ways. First, as growth in the developed world - hitherto underpinned by the US consumer - is expected to remain weak over the next few years, stronger domestic demand may help mitigate some of that weakness. Second, in so far as some of this rebalancing would be done through increased domestic investment, it could help improve productivity and an economy’s productive capacity. A more balanced growth could also help reduce income inequality by improving wage prospects for labour.

27. A strategy that mainly relies on cheap factors of production – labour and other inputs – is not likely to work as well going forward, especially outside excess labour economies like China, India, Indochina and Indonesia. Instead, the rest of Asia will need to look at its own institutions and markets to drive a more sustainable and higher quality growth via strong productivity improvements. In this economic environment, the winners will be those countries that can evolve to be among the world’s leading innovators and designers, rather than countries whose factory floors are buffeted by the volatility of structural change and intensifying competition from large labour surplus economies. Innovation driven economies require supply side nimbleness and strengths: investment in human capital (ie education, healthcare, and research) hard and soft infrastructure including competitive domestic markets; and an environment that will attract and retain talent, as well as foster creativity and entrepreneurship. Such an environment will not be compatible with low cost, production oriented strategies.

28. Rebalancing growth drivers will not be an easy process. China illustrates, on a large scale, the positive aspects of this adjustment as well as some of the difficulties. At one level, China is now drawing on its vast savings to help mitigate the impact of the decline in external demand. Some aspects of its fiscal stimulus such as public infrastructure investment will encourage and strengthen domestic growth. At the same time, short-term concerns over unemployment mean some measures - export rebates, for example - are slowing down adjustments that need to take place for rebalancing to occur. The Chinese authorities are walking a fine line between restructuring the economy for longer-term sustainability and attempts to mitigate short-term pain. It may be that some slowdown in growth is unavoidable in the short-term.

29. China also needs to, over time, bring about a better balance between consumption and investment in GDP. The decline in consumption as a share of GDP makes China vulnerable to external shocks. At the same time, growth has become reliant on investment and on markets to absorb excess supply. This cannot be sustained over the long term. Developing consumption will require more difficult and substantive medium to long term reforms that increase household wage income as a share of GDP and at the same time reduce corporate and household savings. This could include allowing more competition in service industries, recalibrating performance measurement for local officials to include employment and not just GDP growth, and improvements in social safety nets.

30. Understandably much of the focus has been on the negative aspects of this adjustment but I am optimistic that Asia will come out of this crisis in a stronger position. Asia’s fundamentals are generally sound, policy-makers have lots of flexibility, and the population is hard-working and educated. There will be bumps along the way, perhaps a few crises, but if we learn the right lessons from history, especially those of the recent Great Crisis, we can re-tool and re-orientate ourselves so Asia’s development is more balanced and therefore more sustainable.

31. This brings me to the second important implication for Asia arising from the economic crisis. Asian financial institutions and markets have been given tremendous opportunities over the next decade. The globalised Western banking system, hampered by capital constraints and re-regulation, will likely not be able to intermediate the massive capital demand needed to finance Asian growth. This leaves the playing field unusually open for Asian financial institutions and markets, particularly for the next 3-5 years.

32. Fortunately, Asian banks generally came into this crisis much healthier than their global counterparts given the experience of the Asian Crisis in the 1990s. Capital, liquidity, and nonperforming assets were at healthy levels while exposures to toxic assets were limited. Asian household, business and government sectors are relatively un-leveraged with excess debt. In order to take advantage of this opportunity, however, Asian banks and capital markets will need to develop quickly to step into the breach.

33. In this context, the coming redesign of the global financial regulatory architecture will be a major and difficult exercise with its share of opportunities and risks. First, a lack of coordination in regulatory architecture and practice, together with the rising global unemployment in coming years, may lead to regional trading and financial blocs or at worst, a retreat to protectionism and nationalism. Second, the swing of the political and policy pendulum towards greater regulation may end up with overregulation which stifles financial sector efficiency, productive financial innovation and helpful market discipline. Regulatory and development authorities in the financial sector in Asia need to cooperate as never before with each other and with financial institutions to develop regional capital markets.

34. The third important implication for Asia arising from the global financial crisis relates to the issues policy-makers will face as low global interest rates combined with ample liquidity could give rise to volatile capital flows and asset bubbles across Asia. Across the region, we are already beginning to see significant rises in equity and some real estate prices on the back of domestic reflationary policies and some capital inflows. Low global interest rates combined with easy domestic monetary policies could lead to higher speculative asset prices. Like in the early 1990s, managing large capital inflows and prospective bubbles given managed exchange rates will be a major task for policy-makers.

Risks and Challenges

35. The greatest risk to the outlook for Asia is a global economic and financial environment that does not stabilize and recover by 2010. Downside risks remain high, despite signs of stabilization. If the US economy turns out to be worse than expected, requirements for banks’ capital will be higher and the US administration might need to go back to Congress to ask for additional funding.

36. A second risk is that US consumption fundamentals have deteriorated. Nominal incomes are contracting and the savings rate is rising. Income and spending are being supported now by tax rebates, benefits and transfer payments but it is not clear how sustainable these would be. Hence, weak demand and deflation risk are still significant problems. Sustained deflation could cause private consumption and investment to contract further due to higher real interest rates and real debt burdens. The US could relapse into recession and losses and capital needs escalate again.

37. A third risk is protectionism. In developed countries, chronically higher unemployment and a more receptive political leadership will increase pressures to protect domestic industries from Asian exporters. Policies such as subsidies to protect ailing industries could contravene world trade rules, potentially heightening trade tensions. But protectionism is not just a developed country phenomenon: several developing countries are using import restrictions to mitigate the impact of slowing global demand and weaker current account balances. Clearly there is a danger - probably highest if there is no recovery next year - that protectionism could rise dramatically.

38. A major challenge going forward is the uncertainty raised by the apparent failure of Western or American models which, at the extreme, put financial markets above other sectors of the economy. Will there be a structural change in how savings are mobilized and allocated in the West? Will the state guided models of the East do better? It will take time before we will know the answers to these questions but the balance between private and public sector as the prime economic driver is shifting towards the latter, likely in significant and long-lasting ways.

Conclusion

39. To sum up, Asia has experienced a dramatic slowdown but Asia’s fundamentals are strong. As the global economy stabilises, Asian economic growth will recover. China and India will do relatively better but cannot be the drivers for the world economy in the short-term. But over time, China’s and India’s growth will anchor both the region and a global economy that is likely to see more balanced and sustainable growth. The greatest risk to the region is a failure of policies in the developed world and a return to isolationism or protectionism. More generally, however, there are serious unanswered questions on the role of markets and the state, including the appropriate level of regulation and state intervention. In this environment, Asian banks and capital markets will face both a tremendous challenge and opportunity to intermediate huge regional savings to meet massive capital demand from Asian growth and the integration of major Asian emerging economies into the modern global economy.

Friday, July 10, 2009

Why economists did not see collapse coming

Business Times - 10 Jul 2009

By ROBERT SAMUELSON

(WASHINGTON)

NIALL Ferguson is one of those rare characters: a respected scholar who's also a successful populariser. Ferguson, a Brit, has taught at Oxford, New York University and now at Harvard. He has written about World War I, the British Empire and the Rothschilds (Europe's most powerful banking family).

He has turned four of his projects into TV documentaries, the latest of which - The Ascent of Money, which is also a book - began airing on PBS on July 8. It is a programme that could be usefully viewed by most of America's roughly 13,000 economists.

One intriguing sub-plot of the economic crisis is the failure of most economists to predict it. Here we have the most spectacular economic and financial crisis in decades - possibly since the Great Depression - and the one group that spends most of its waking hours analysing the economy basically missed it. Oh, a few economists can legitimately claim some foresight. But they are a handful. Most were as surprised as the rest of us.

Why? This is a compelling question without, as yet, a compelling answer. Indeed, so far as I can tell, economists have not engaged in rigorous self-criticism to explain their lapse. We've had some casual theories and some partisan recriminations: 'Free-market ideology' is a standard scapegoat on the assumption that most economists are 'free-market ideologues'.

But that's not true. In any case, the crisis surprised liberal and conservative economists, Republicans and Democrats alike.

This brings us back to Ferguson. The creation of money was a seminal historic event; so was the subsequent invention of finance - the saving and investing of money.

Without them, we could never have moved beyond barter to a modern economy based on specialisation and building for the future. But these advances came interwoven with bubbles, crashes, swindles and hyperinflations.

Finance has been a wellspring of both progress and instability.

Ferguson is an able guide. He relates the creation of the bond market by Italian city-states in the 14th century as a way to finance their wars against each other; he explains the South Sea and Mississippi 'bubbles' in England and France around 1720 - stock market manipulations based on fantasised riches in the New World; and, finally, he visits the recent housing bubble.

Ferguson's breezy tour suggests two reasons why the present crisis embarrassed most economists. The first involves finance itself. The crisis originated in financial markets (the markets for stocks, bonds, and many complex securities), and yet finance occupies a peripheral position in mainstream economics.

It's studied by a subset of economists and financial markets - their ups, downs and side effects - are not considered big sources of economic expansions and slumps.

Economists tend to focus directly on the spending of consumers, businesses and government. It was also widely assumed that deposit insurance and the existence of the Federal Reserve would prevent financial panics.

Well, if you de-emphasise financial markets and financial markets are decisive, you're out to lunch. Financial markets pumped up the real estate bubble; greater housing and stock market wealth inspired a consumer spending boom; losses on 'sub-prime' mortgage securities triggered a collapse of confidence.

Some economists have grudgingly, if obscurely, conceded error. A study by the International Monetary Fund called Initial Lessons of the Crisis admits: '(There) was an under-appreciation of systemic risks coming from . . . financial sector feedbacks onto the real economy.' That's an understatement.

Overshadowing the misunderstanding of finance is a larger mistake: ignoring history. By and large, most economists don't care much about history. Introductory college textbooks spend little, if any, time exploring business cycles of the 19th century.

The emphasis is on 'principles of economics' (the title of many basic texts), as if most endure forever.

Economists focused on constructing elegant, mathematical models. 'For years, theorists held the intellectual high ground', writes economic historian Barry Eichengreen of the University of California at Berkeley. 'They were the high-prestige members of the profession.'

History is messy and constantly changing, as Ferguson reminds us. It depends on institutions, technologies, laws, cultural and religious values, governments, popular beliefs and much more. Model-building and theorising can sometimes simplify the real world in ways that provide insights.

But often, the models' assumptions depart so radically from reality that the conclusions become useless. Someone who studies history becomes humble in the face of the ceaseless changes and capricious mixing of motives.

Economists thought they had solved the problem of economic stability. Their tools sufficed to prevent widespread economic collapse, even if they couldn't control every twist in the business cycle.

This conceit may have once been true. No more. Markets became more complex; more money crossed national borders; people became complacent. History moved on, but economists didn't. -- LATWP

China will help drive global growth, says Soros

Business Times - 10 Jul 2009

(NEW YORK) Billionaire George Soros called China 'a positive force' that will help drive growth as the world emerges from the current economic crisis.

'For China, the crisis is something affecting them from the outside,' said Mr Soros, 78, in a Bloomberg Radio interview. 'They can stimulate their economy. They have reserves. They have a trade surplus. They will be one of the motors of the world economy.' Mr Soros, who is no longer involved in the day-to-day operation of his US$24 billion New York-based Soros Fund Management LLC, has said that the growth rate of the last 25 years will not resume.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) said that the global economic rebound next year will be stronger than it forecast in April as the financial system stabilises. The Washington-based lender said in a revised forecast released on Wednesday that the world economy will expand 2.5 per cent in 2010, compared with its April projection of 1.9 per cent.

China's growth is forecast to accelerate to 8.5 per cent next year, a percentage point more than the IMF expected in April, after slowing to 7.5 per cent this year.

Mr Soros warned that the current crisis will not be solved only by boosting consumer and business confidence. US banks are still holding a lot of bad assets and that will weigh on the economy, he said. 'There is a part of reality that can't be manipulated,' he said.

Soros's Quantum Endowment Fund has returned almost 18 per cent this year till May after climbing 8 per cent in 2008.

The financial crisis, which started with the collapse of the US property market in 2007, has triggered more than US$1.47 trillion of write-downs and credit losses at banks and other financial institutions and sent the global economy into its first recession since World War II, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. -- Bloomberg

Tuesday, July 7, 2009

Realities of the US dollar system

Business Times - 07 Jul 2009

THE question of a new global reserve currency will likely be raised again at the Group of Eight industrial countries (G-8) meeting in Italy this week, judging from developments over the last fortnight. China has reportedly asked for debate on the issue when leaders from the G-8 meet leaders of the G-5 emerging economies on the sidelines of the summit. Ahead of the talks, China, India and Russia have all pressed for a rethinking of how the world's currency reserves, currently US dollar-dominated, should be composed.

It has not been just rhetoric - China for instance said recently that it will allow companies to use the yuan to settle cross-border trade and let them keep their entitlement to export tax rebates to reduce the reliance of importers and exporters on the US dollar. The People's Bank of China agreed to provide a total of 650 billion yuan (the equivalent of about US$95 billion) to Argentina, Belarus, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea through so-called currency swaps to expand the yuan's usage. China and Brazil in May began studying a proposal to move away from the US dollar for trade settlement and use the yuan and reais instead.

But for all that, the countries pushing for a diminished role for the US dollar face a delicate balancing act. China and India remain dependent on the currency of the US, the world's largest economy and a US$2.5 trillion export market. The International Monetary Fund said on June 30 that the share of US dollars in global foreign exchange reserves, despite the financial crisis, increased to 65 per cent in the first three months of this year, the highest since 2007. It is this exposure, and worries about the impact of US economic weakness and its ballooning deficit on the US dollar, that are driving emerging countries to diversify their foreign currency reserves and to reduce their dependence on the greenback. Yet, any move to reduce the importance of the US dollar may drive its value down, and erode the value of the huge US dollar-denominated assets of these nations.

This was the point made by Japan, which has expressed caution on calls to diminish the US dollar as the key international currency. Yoichi Suzuki, director-general of the Japanese foreign ministry's economic affairs bureau, pointed out that it would not benefit any country to talk about ideas for a new global key currency which would weaken the US dollar.

There are also market realities. For all the criticism of the US dollar, it remains the only real international currency recognised by global markets - US dollar bonds sold by the same emerging-market countries pushing for a new global currency are outperforming debt traded in reais, roubles and yuan. Any attempt to replace the US dollar as the global currency, which has underpinned exchange rates since the 1971 collapse of the Bretton Woods system, could likely lead to major dislocations in trade, economic activity and financial markets.

Monday, July 6, 2009

It's back to the 1930s for US economy

Business Times - 04 Jul 2009

Once again, a president has pushed through job-creation policies which aren't aggressive enough

By PAUL KRUGMAN

OK, THURSDAY'S jobs report settles it. We're going to need a bigger stimulus. But does the president know that? Let's do the math. Since the recession began, the US economy has lost 6.5 million jobs - and as that grim employment report confirmed, it's continuing to lose jobs at a rapid pace.

Once you take into account the 100,000 plus new jobs that we need each month just to keep up with a growing population, we're about 8.5 million jobs in the hole.

And the deeper the hole gets, the harder it will be to dig ourselves out. The job figures weren't the only bad news in Thursday's report, which also showed wages stalling and possibly on the verge of outright decline. That's a recipe for a descent into Japanese-style deflation, which is very difficult to reverse. Lost decade, anyone? Wait - there's more bad news: the fiscal crisis of the states.

Unlike the federal government, states are required to run balanced budgets. And faced with a sharp drop in revenue, most states are preparing savage budget cuts, many of them at the expense of the most vulnerable. Aside from directly creating a great deal of misery, these cuts will depress the economy even further.

So what do we have to counter this scary prospect? We have the Obama stimulus plan, which aims to create 3.5 million jobs by late next year. That's much better than nothing, but it's not remotely enough. And there doesn't seem to be much else going on.

Do you remember the administration's plan to sharply reduce the rate of foreclosures, or its plan to get the banks lending again by taking toxic assets off their balance sheets? Neither do I.

All of this is depressingly familiar to anyone who has studied US economic policy in the 1930s. Once again, a Democratic president has pushed through job- creation policies that will mitigate the slump but aren't aggressive enough to produce a full recovery. Once again, much of the stimulus at the federal level is being undone by budget retrenchment at the state and local level.

So have we failed to learn from history, and are we, therefore, doomed to repeat it? Not necessarily - but it's up to the president and his economic team to ensure that things are different this time.

President Barack Obama and his officials need to ramp up their efforts, starting with a plan to make the stimulus bigger.

Just to be clear, I'm well aware of how difficult it will be to get such a plan enacted.

There won't be any cooperation from Republican leaders, who have settled on a strategy of total opposition, unconstrained by facts or logic. Indeed, these leaders responded to the latest job numbers by proclaiming the failure of the Obama economic plan. That's ludicrous, of course. The administration warned from the beginning that it would be several quarters before the plan had any major positive effects.

But that didn't stop the chairman of the Republican Study Committee from issuing a statement demanding: 'Where are the jobs?' It's also not clear whether the administration will get much help from Senate 'centrists', who partially eviscerated the original stimulus plan by demanding cuts in aid to state and local governments - aid that, as we're now seeing, was desperately needed. I'd like to think that some of these centrists are feeling remorse, but if they are, I haven't seen any evidence to that effect.

And as an economist, I'd add that many members of my profession are playing a distinctly unhelpful role.

It has been a rude shock to see so many economists with good reputations recycling old fallacies - like the claim that any rise in government spending automatically displaces an equal amount of private spending, even when there is mass unemployment - and lending their names to grossly exaggerated claims about the evils of short-run budget deficits. (Right now, the risks associated with additional debt are much less than the risks associated with failing to give the economy adequate support.)

Also, as in the 1930s, the opponents of action are peddling scare stories about inflation even as deflation looms.

So getting another round of stimulus will be difficult. But it's essential.

Obama administration economists understand the stakes. Indeed, just a few weeks ago, Christina Romer, the chairwoman of the Council of Economic Advisers, published an article on the 'lessons of 1937' - the year that FDR gave in to the deficit and inflation hawks, with disastrous consequences both for the economy and for his political agenda.

What I don't know is whether the administration has faced up to the inadequacy of what it has done so far.

So here's my message to the president: You need to get both your economic team and your political people working on additional stimulus, now. Because if you don't, you'll soon be facing your own personal 1937. -- NYT

  • The writer is a Princeton University professor of economics and international affairs, and last year's winner of the Nobel Prize in economics

Friday, June 12, 2009

Global system needs global currency: Volcker

Business Times - 12 Jun 2009
He questions if US$ as an international currency is in US's long-term interests

By ANTHONY ROWLEY IN BEIJING

SPEAKING in Beijing's Great Hall of the People, former US Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker last night acknowledged the legitimacy of China's concerns over the dollar and questioned whether it was in the long-run interests of the United States to continue providing an international currency.

The 'ultimate logic of a globalised financial system is, to me, a global currency', said Mr Volcker, now head of President Barrack Obama's Economic Recovery Advisory Board, in a speech to senior Chinese and other bankers from around the world.

His comments seem bound to open up a controversial debate on the future of the dollar as a global currency. Us Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has been criticised recently for also appearing sympathetic to China's concerns on this issue.

Mr Volcker also suggested during his speech as guest of the Institute of International Finance at its Beijing meeting that 'the sudden and unsettling drop' in global economic activity is slowing. But he warned that 'prospects for a really strong recovery, typical of most recessions seems unlikely'.

Instead, 'a long slog with continuing high levels of unemployment seems to be in store'. he said. 'For most of the developed world, sources of strong, spontaneous growth are hard to envisage. In the US, as elsewhere, even modest growth remains dependent on strong fiscal and monetary stimulus.'

Likewise, although 'a healing process in financial markets seems to be underway, the global financial system remains in intensive care', said the monetary world veteran. The best that can be said is that the system is 'out of the emergency room', he added.

On the dollar issue, Mr Volcker noted that 'Chinese officials have recently raised questions about the implications for China and others that are holding so many dollars'.

'I think it is reasonable to ask whether it is in the long-run interests of the United States itself to provide what is essentially a public good - an international currency - in amounts so large as to raise questions about its ultimate stability.'

However, he added: 'The fact is that there are no practical alternatives for today or for many tomorrows to the US dollar as an international currency.

'I think it should be clearly understood that the central responsibility of the United States - in its own interest, in China's interest, and in the world's interest - is to maintain both the purchasing power of the dollar at home and in international markets, and a strong and open financial system.'

He acknowledged that 'the present state of world affairs has made clear that our international monetary arrangements have not provided a needed element of discipline for either surplus or deficit countries'.

'Deep and ultimately destabilising imbalances have been prolonged, specifically the growing and seemingly irresistible current imbalances between China and much of the rest of Asia and the US. These have for years been covered by flows of foreign official and privately held dollars back to the US.

'Indirectly, those flows have to some degree helped fuel the mortgage market and the housing bubble that touched off the financial collapse.'

Touching on the financial crisis, Mr Volcker warned that 'moral hazard' is in danger of becoming embedded as a result of official bailouts of financial institutions and because of the 'too big to fail' ethos that pervades official attitudes towards mounting rescues of such institutions.

'We can, and we should, take steps to limit the need and possibility of official bailouts.'

He also called for accounting reforms and questioned the wisdom of attempts to enforce strict mark to market accounting for financial institutions.

Wednesday, June 3, 2009

Thoughts for the long run

Business Times - 03 Jun 2009

This crisis is not going to turn into a Great Depression as in terms of GDP, it will be similar to those of the 50s, 60s, 70s and 80s

OVERVIEW

JEREMY Siegel is a teacher and scholar who holds an endowed chair at one of the world's leading business schools, the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Yet, he is best known for his book Stocks for the Long Run. First published in 1994, the book is a financial bestseller and is now in its fourth edition. The Washington Post placed it on its list of the 10 best business books of all time.

Dr Siegel appears frequently on CNN, CNBC and National Public Radio. He writes a regular column for Kiplinger's and Yahoo Finance and has contributed articles to The Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times as well as other leading business publications. He spoke with Citi's chief investment officer Jeff Applegate and took questions from listeners in an April 8 conference call for investment professionals.

Mr Applegate: Reports have come out that stocks don't have nearly the advantage over bonds over the long term as often thought, and that there are long periods in which bonds outperformed stocks. Can they be right?

Dr Siegel: Well, if you calculate the 40-year return on stocks and bonds as of the March 9 low, government bonds did outperform. That's not true any more with the rally we just had in the stock market. Over the long term, stocks have about a three-percentage-point edge over bonds.
If there is a bubble going on right now, it's in US government bonds, which are sure to fall in value. This is absolutely the worst time to make the comparison between the returns on bonds and stocks.

Mr Applegate: Do you think March 9 was the low for the stock market?

Dr Siegel: I tend to believe that - but, certainly, I can't make that guarantee. If we assume it's the low, then the market was down more than 50 per cent from the peak. Once you've declined 50 per cent, investors are generally looking at 10-12 per cent gains a year, going ahead three to five years and sometimes much more. Now that the market has moved up, many will give up, saying: 'Gee, I already missed the first 25 per cent.' Don't feel bad about that! There's a lot more to go. And, actually, you're not out of the bear market until we've broken through a previous rally high, about 940 on the S&P 500.

Mr Applegate: Would your remarks about US equities extend to global equities as well?

Dr Siegel: Yes. We've all been amazed at how correlated world markets are. They're moving in sync. This happened in 1987, too. In a crisis, you don't get the benefit of diversification.

In terms of recovery, I am most optimistic about Asia. I'm least optimistic about Europe. The Europeans are saying this is a US problem and have been reluctant to lower rates as much as the US has done. I believe that they will come around and get their rates down to our level. Still, the fact is that they've delayed - meaning it's going to take longer to get out of the recession.

I'm optimistic about the emerging markets. They had become way overblown and got hit badly, but they've rallied nicely. They're up year to date, and we're not. China and India are not falling apart. Their currencies have stabilised after an initial decline, and their stock markets have stabilised, too.

Mr Applegate: You've written recently that the way in which earnings for the Standard & Poor's 500 Index is calculated distorts the picture. Can you explain?

Dr Siegel: When S&P computes aggregate earnings, it adds dollar for dollar the losses of any company to the gains of any other, without any regard for the market value of these companies. On its website, S&P says it looks at the S&P 500 as 500 divisions of a single company, and the losses of one cancel out the gains of another.

That is absolutely wrong. Clearly, the losses of one firm don't cancel out the gains of another if they're separate firms. AIG had a 2008 loss of US$95 billion that was more than twice the total profits of Exxon Mobil. AIG had a market value of US$15 billion while Exxon Mobil was almost US$400 billion; yet, S&P says that all Exxon Mobil's profits are cancelled out. If you held a market-weighted portfolio of both those stocks, 95 per cent of your money would be in the oil company, yet S&P would say your portfolio didn't have any earnings.

The point of this is that if you correct S&P earnings for market value of the companies reporting those earnings, you don't get anywhere near the terrible earnings that you do when you add all these financial losses together with the gains. AIG shouldn't even be in the S&P 500 anymore. If you took it out, S&P earnings would go up by US$10 a share.

Mr Applegate: Many people believe all the money that is getting pumped into the economy will cause inflation. Do you agree?

Dr Siegel: No, because I do believe that the Federal Reserve will pull back as necessary when the economy recovers. The board members understand their charge, which is to keep prices within a stable range. They must also prevent deflation because, when we look back at the 1930s, it was, in fact, the tremendous collapse in prices - the Consumer Price Index went down 35 per cent between 1929 and 1934 - that essentially bankrupted everybody who was in debt. In real terms, debts rose by more than one-third.

Of course, the Fed is also working to prevent a breakdown of the banking system - which did collapse in the 1930s when the Fed did nothing to prevent it. That is equally as important as preventing deflation.

All these policies are the reason why this tremendous financial crisis is not going to turn into a Great Depression. In terms of GDP (gross domestic product), this recession will be similar to those of the 50s, 60s, 70s and 80s. The problem is that everyone got used to the light recessions of 1990, 1991 and 2001 and thought we were in a new world of very low economic volatility. That is one of the factors that, in fact, encouraged all the risk taking that led to this crisis.

Mr Applegate: Is there anything that can be done if you are worried about inflation?

Dr Siegel: Get a home and lock in your 30-year fixed-rate mortgage at less than 5 per cent. If you pay a reasonable price now, you have hedged yourself and your investment against all that liquidity that we see going forward.

Mr Applegate: So you think real estate prices have bottomed?

Dr Siegel: Very near. It's still got farther down to go, but not too much. There are two prices now, there's the buyer's bid price on a lot of stuff and then there's the ask price by the sellers. Sellers are slowly coming to the realisation that if they want to sell, they're going to have to get much closer to those bid prices.

Look at the Affordability Index that is put out by the National Association of Homebuilders. It measures the degree to which the average family can afford to buy the average home - given their income, given the price of homes and given the interest rate. By this index, real estate has rarely, if ever, been more affordable for the average family to buy the average home. That is, in large part, due to the very low interest rates.

The interview was first published in May issue of Citi Private Bank's 'The View'. Opinions expressed herein should be regarded solely as general market commentary, and may change without prior notice. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

Geithner calms Chinese fears - for now

Business Times - 03 Jun 2009

TIMOTHY Geithner's maiden visit to China as US treasury secretary appears to have, for now, calmed some of the fears surrounding one of the world's most important bilateral economic relationships. However, the Obama administration will have to be seen to deliver on some of Mr Geithner's ambitious-sounding promises.

On the eve of his visit to Beijing, the US treasury secretary was faced with a delicate challenge. During his confirmation hearings in January, he had labelled China a 'currency manipulator', which had riled the Chinese establishment. Subsequently, as the US financial crisis deepened, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao openly voiced concerns about the vulnerability of the US dollar in which the bulk of China's reserves are denominated, and hinted at the need for an alternative reserve currency.

Mr Geithner's priority was clearly to reassure the Chinese that the US dollar would remain a safe bet and that China had no cause to worry about its holdings of US Treasuries, amounting to US$768 billion as at the end of March.

But at the same time, he had to get the message across that China, too, has its part to play: it needs to make its currency more flexible and shift its economy away from export-led to domestic demand-led growth, to both help reduce its oversized trade surplus and to augment global reflation.

While in Beijing, Mr Geithner said all the right things: the US is committed to a 'strong dollar', China's investments in US financial assets are very safe, and the Obama administration is committed to reducing the US fiscal deficit over the medium term to a sustainable level. He also reiterated - more diplomatically than during his confirmation hearings - the US desire for a more flexible (read 'stronger') yuan and the need for Beijing to boost domestic demand.

But the promises will have to be backed up with meaningful action. Mr Geithner suggested, for instance, that the US aims to bring its fiscal deficit down to 'roughly 3 per cent' of GDP over the medium term, from close to 13 per cent at present. There are no credible policies in place to achieve this; much would depend on how the Obama administration proceeds with tax and spending measures, and particularly, healthcare reform, in the months to come.

Absent effective fiscal policies, the dollar, as well as US Treasury yields, would remain vulnerable. For its part, China, while professing to keep the yuan 'stable', did not oblige with any promises to appreciate its currency. And while it has put in place an aggressive economic stimulus package, the extent to which this will boost domestic consumption (as opposed to investment) demand remains to be seen.

Thus while the rhetoric on the US-China economic relationship might have helped calm nerves following Mr Geithner's visit to Beijing, what matters will be delivery on promises made - and the markets will be watching.

Geithner reassures China on US$ holdings

Business Times - 03 Jun 2009

Washington committed to keeping dollar strong and inflation low, he says

(BEIJING) Chinese officials are giving US efforts to pump up its ailing economy a vote of confidence and understand why higher budget deficits are a temporary necessity, US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said here yesterday.

Mr Geithner, on his first visit to China as Treasury chief, gave fresh assurances that Beijing can sleep easy over its huge holdings of US Treasury debt because Washington is committed to keeping the dollar strong and inflation low.

President Barack Obama's administration, moreover, is determined to get back to living within its means as soon as the crisis has passed, Mr Geithner said in a trio of interviews ahead of meetings with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. 'I've actually found a lot of confidence here in China, justifiable confidence, in the strength and resilience and dynamism of the American economy,' he said.

China is the single-biggest holder of US government debt - it held US$768 billion in Treasuries in March - and has watched uneasily as Washington has spent lavishly to try to haul the US economy out of its deepest recession in 80 years.

Mr Obama is budgeting for a deficit of 12.3 per cent of national output this year - four times China's shortfall - while the Fed has resorted to unorthodox policies, including purchasing hundreds of billions of dollars worth of US Treasury debt, to unclog the arteries of the banking system. The risk that this will spark inflation, eroding the value of China's holdings, has caused unease in Beijing, where leaders are conscious of public criticism that they should be spending more money at home instead of lending it to America.

But Mr Geithner gave a staunch defence of America's expansive policy, describing it as the 'fiscally conservative' option. 'If we had not acted aggressively, our deficits would have been higher in the future,' he said.

'We are very committed to make sure that when recovery is established that we go back to living within our means; that we bring our fiscal deficits down to a sustainable level; that we unwind and reverse these exceptional measures we've taken in the financial sector,' he added.
Mr Geithner spoke to Chinese state television, the CNBC business channel and, in a webchat, to the English-language China Daily.

The Treasury chief heaped praise on Fed chairman Ben Bernanke, who he said had done 'an enormously impressive job in the worst financial crisis in decades'.

The Fed's cooperation with other central banks in ensuring ample levels of cash in global money markets had been critical to helping stabilise the crisis. 'But I am completely confident, as should you be, that he will have not just the will but the ability to bring this down so that we achieve the obligation of making sure that inflation is low and stable in the United States going forward,' he said.

'We will do everything that is necessary to try to make sure we're sustaining confidence in US financial markets, not just in the United States but around the world,' Mr Geithner added.

China has reacted to the risk of inflation leading to losses on its bond portfolio by buying more short-term Treasury bills. The nagging inflation worries and general market shift towards shorter-dated debt have driven up 10-year note yields and pushed the yield gap between two-year and 10-year notes near record highs on Monday.

Premier Wen reminded Mr Geithner of his concerns about the safety of China's dollar assets by saying there was a need to 'tighten oversight of international reserve currencies so as to ensure the stability and growth of China', Xinhua reported.

Analysts assume that Beijing is already hedging its bets by switching at the margin from the dollar into other currencies. Central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan unsettled markets in March by floating the long-term possibility of even replacing the dollar as the world's main reserve currency with the Special Drawing Right (SDR), the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) unit of account.

Russia said yesterday that it might discuss the idea of such a super-sovereign currency when the leaders of Brazil, India, Russia and China meet later this month.

But Mr Geithner was unruffled by all the talk. 'I believe the Chinese expect the dollar to be the principal reserve currency for a long period of time, as do we,' he said.

Mr Geithner, eschewing confrontation as he seeks to build trust, was gentle in encouraging China to let the yuan's exchange rate rise - something that would help to reduce the country's big trade surplus by making its exports more expensive and imports cheaper.

The Chinese currency climbed 21 per cent against the dollar between July 2005 and last summer.

But since then, to shield China's exporters, Beijing has kept the exchange rate on hold.

'They have committed publicly to continue to move over time towards a more flexible exchange rate system because I think they recognise that is essential to their broader strategy of rebalancing sources of growth,' Mr Geithner said.

Turning to the global economy, he said there had been early signs of stabilisation, and he was very encouraged by signs that confidence was returning to markets. What had been a real risk of financial collapse had receded to a significant degree. 'But it's early, and this is still a very powerful storm. It's causing enormous pressures and damage, uncertainty, not just across our economy but in economies around the world,' he said.

As Mr Geithner flew out of Beijing, the US government announced that the US and China would inaugurate their Cabinet-level Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington in the last week of July.

Tuesday, June 2, 2009

China explains energy-growth data mismatch

Business Times - 02 Jun 2009

(BEIJING) China defended its economic data yesterday after the International Energy Agency (IEA) questioned the consistency between the nation's growth rate and its falling energy demand.

Critics have said the country's growth does not match up with its weakening oil and electricity demand.

But Zhang Guobao, head of the National Energy Administration, said this was due to a change in the nation's industrial mix.

'High energy-consuming industry is on the decline, and low energy-consuming industry is on the rise, so this has impacted electricity consumption,' he told reporters.

Overall electricity consumption in China from January to April dropped 4 per cent compared to the same period in 2008, according to a statement released by the Energy Administration.

In the same period, China imported 57 million tonnes of crude oil, a 4.5 per cent drop from a year earlier, Mr Zhang said.

But China's first-quarter GDP grew by 6.1 per cent.

Historically, demand for oil and electricity products is used as a proxy for gross domestic product growth.

The IEA in its May report on the oil market questioned the figures.

'Oddly enough, (first quarter of 2009) reported GDP growth does not tally with oil demand data (nor with electricity demand, which was also inordinately weak),' it said.

But Mr Zhang pointed to slowing growth in heavy industry, which traditionally accounts for around 80 per cent of industrial electricity consumption.

He said the oil-processing and coking industries had dropped by 5.4 per cent in the first quarter, whereas communications - a low energy-consuming sector - had increased 15.5 per cent.

Mr Zhang also said part of the demand for steel and non-ferrous metals had recently been met by existing inventories instead of new production, which would have increased electricity consumption.

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