Business Times - 26 Aug 2009
THERE will be no end to people pursuing two main things: wealth and prosperity. These are pursued by Singapore too. One of Singapore main achievements is economic.
The socio-economic status of the city state with a population of almost four million is on par with that of the world's richest countries. Following its separation from Malaysia that saddened Lee Kuan Yew, the country nursed the ambition of becoming a manufacturing hub, and subsequently became a centre for the service sector.
Processing of permits, service and prowess in attracting investors and tourists largely guide them in their every policy and action. Education is promoted - in fact, subsidies are granted to churn out intelligent and skilled citizens. Nationalism and self-defence are other aspects that get enhanced too, including national service and campaigns aimed at inculcating national pride. It has among the most sophisticated weapons in the region. Singapore is one of the respected countries that could not be ignored in terms of military might.
Like it or not, Singapore is in fact one of the countries that Indonesia depends on while Indonesians enjoy visiting it. Indonesians make up the largest number of international visitors to Singapore. When they make trips to various parts of the world, most Indonesians fly Singapore Airlines.
Singapore is also the transit point for imports, exports and other socioeconomic activities. It is also the business capital and hub for the region which includes Indonesia.
The problem that crops up is that Singapore's comprehensive and clear policy attaches importance to its own interest. This is only logical, and all countries do likewise. No matter how harsh the criticism and strong the hatred towards Singapore, it enjoys sovereignty.
However, if its policy overlaps with another country's, problems at times break out. Apart from Malaysia, Indonesia becomes the 'victim' here.
Singapore's arguments are also strong with its anticipatory, visionary and tactical policy, if not to say rather 'cunning'. Which country is not tactical or, say, 'cunning' when it concerns international relations?
In this context of being cunning, Indonesia needs to understand, and do the same. However, Indonesia is clearly way behind and loses out here.
This may be noticed, for instance, when Indonesia wishes to get its corrupt citizens 'hiding' in Singapore extradited. To conclude an extradition treaty, Singapore wants it to be complemented with a Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) which essentially allows it to conduct military training in Indonesian territory with a relatively free hand.
It is here that problems arise, because it involves sovereignty. In other words, the extradition treaty must be complemented with the DCA. The oddity lies with the Indonesian side. And, after a process that was not made known to the public, the extradition treaty and DCA were inked in Bali.
Subsequently, there were protests in parliament that declined to ratify the agreements. What did Singapore have to say? 'After the agreements were signed, came the objections. In fact, after the signing, we partied and even had karaoke,' said Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo.
Blame game
The agreements stalled, with Singapore putting the 'blame' more on Indonesia. However, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said: 'Singapore made a new proposal for the agreements to be restored.' However, Singapore insists on treating the extradition treaty and DCA as a package. 'However, Indonesia chose to stand firm to this issue,' said Mr Lee.
Apparently, the ball is now in Indonesia's court. And the question is how could Indonesia be unaware of what was happening? How could Indonesia, or at least a handful of people, go through a process that ended with the extradition treaty and DCA? Does the old position still surface, ie whatever the government does is bound to have been approved by the People's Representative Council (DPR)? In drawing up the extradition treaty, which was most probably based on international law, must a certain degree of Indonesia's territorial 'sovereignty' be sacrificed?
The conclusion is: We are not ready and do not understand Singapore's tactical and comprehensive strategy.
The above editorial was published in Indonesia's Kompas on Aug 14
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Showing posts with label politics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label politics. Show all posts
Wednesday, August 26, 2009
Wednesday, August 12, 2009
Causeway expansion rejected
Business Times - 12 Aug 2009
(JOHOR BARU) The Johor Baru Umno Youth division has opposed a Singapore proposal to expand the Johor Causeway as it will not solve the pollution problem in the Johor Straits.
Its chief, Khalid Mohamad, said that the proposal to expand the 85-year-old Johor Causeway by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong should be rejected as it was not based on mutual benefit.
'The expansion of the Johor Causeway will only prolong the water pollution problem in the Johor Straits. It will not address the problem,' he said.
He said that the proposal to expand the Johor Causeway was made in the interest of one party and would not solve the many problems faced by Johor and Malaysia.
He added that Johor Baru city folk wanted to see free flow of water from the East and West of the Johor Straits\. \-- Bernama
(JOHOR BARU) The Johor Baru Umno Youth division has opposed a Singapore proposal to expand the Johor Causeway as it will not solve the pollution problem in the Johor Straits.
Its chief, Khalid Mohamad, said that the proposal to expand the 85-year-old Johor Causeway by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong should be rejected as it was not based on mutual benefit.
'The expansion of the Johor Causeway will only prolong the water pollution problem in the Johor Straits. It will not address the problem,' he said.
He said that the proposal to expand the Johor Causeway was made in the interest of one party and would not solve the many problems faced by Johor and Malaysia.
He added that Johor Baru city folk wanted to see free flow of water from the East and West of the Johor Straits\. \-- Bernama
Thursday, July 16, 2009
What ails China's Xinjiang province
Business Times - 16 Jul 2009
Last week's violence shows there's clearly something wrong that neither a clampdown nor spending more money will fix
By JOHN GEE
THE violence in China's Xinjiang province has been damped down for now, but serious damage has been done. Blaming the troubles on outside interference was the predictable reaction of a government wrongfooted by events.
The immediate cause of last week's violence was the escalating response to an incident in Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong province, in which Uighur workers were alleged to have molested a Han Chinese woman.
But this begs the question of why relations between many Han and Uighur Chinese citizens should be in such a fragile state that a possible case of sexual harassment should lead to so much violence. The incident became a lightning rod for the expression of other discontents.
China was an empire for most of its history. The experiences of its non-Han Chinese peoples differed considerably. In the more outlying areas, including Tibet and Xinjiang, central government authority sat lightly for long periods of time; in return for a formal acceptance of imperial authority, Beijing was content to leave in place the local power structures, cultures and religious observances.
Closer to the imperial centres of power, some nationalities faced more heavy-handed treatment by the government and felt threatened by encroachments on their lands and livelihoods by Han Chinese arrivals.
When the Communist Party of China was established, its policy on the 'national question' in China followed that developed by Soviet communists. Their understanding of national oppression and how it should be countered had been crystalised as early as 1913 in Marxism and the National Question, an essay that established Joseph Stalin as the Bolsheviks' leading authority on the issue and, incidentally, defined nationhood in narrow Eurocentric terms as a feature of 'the epoch of rising capitalism'.
The Bolsheviks' official stand was that pre-revolutionary Russia was a 'prison house of nations', and it should be replaced by a voluntary union in which the people of all nationalities would be equal. A distinction was made between 'nations' and 'nationalities'.
Peoples such as the Ukrainians and the Kazakhs were held to have all the characteristics of nationhood, and this was acknowledged by establishing republics for them that, in theory, were voluntary member-states of the Soviet Union and could secede if they wished.
In reality, the Soviet Union was far more centrally controlled than its Tsarist predecessor. Only with the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s did it prove possible to exercise that right, and all the republics did so with alacrity.
Soviet experience
'Nationalities' were seen as being somewhat less than fully formed nations. Official policy towards them was that they should have a right to various degrees of autonomy, but not to secede from the republic within which they lived. Hence, they were given autonomous republics and regions. This has led to big complications since the break-up of the Soviet Union, with members of some nationalities (most notably, the Chechens) seeking to achieve independent status for their autonomous entity or unification with others of their nationality (as in the case of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabagh).
As far removed as this might seem from present-day China, it is directly relevant, as the Soviet experience not only informed Chinese communist policy making in the past, but the circumstances of the collapse of the Soviet Union are seen as a lesson in what should be avoided.
After the Chinese communists took power in 1949, they recognised over 50 different populations as nationalities, which they regarded as part of a larger Chinese nation. Extensive areas with a high concentration of a particular nationality - roughly 45 per cent of the country - were designated as autonomous regions: Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia and Guangxi. Some smaller autonomous units were also created.
Crucially, none of the minority peoples were regarded as nations with republican status on the Soviet model and a constitutional right (however constricted in practice) to secede from the Chinese state.
Foreign perceptions of China's nationalities policy have been largely moulded by the example of Tibet, but the record has been more mixed than that unhappy case might suggest. China can cite progress in the autonomous regions in health care, education and housing, investments in infrastructure and other indicators of progress. Also at times of greatest hardship, such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, people of all nationalities suffered, without discrimination. The problem here - and it has been a problem all along - is that the official approach is overwhelmingly defined in social and economic terms that take little account of attitudes and values.
Demographic issues
The treatment of religion is a case in point. While all religious groups came under various forms of pressure after 1949, the communist leadership saw Confucianism as having had a particularly harmful effect on China by inculcating submission to traditional authorities.
During the Cultural Revolution, there was even a 'campaign to criticise Lin Biao and Confucius'. So the belief system that had been most influential among China's majority population was certainly not treated favourably compared to the religions traditionally dominant among the minority nationalities, but that might not be what the minorities saw. What mattered to the religious among them was that their mosques and temples were attacked by Red Guards and that their values were denigrated: They often experienced things such as offences against their nationality, irrespective of the fact that they were not being specifically targeted by the leadership in Beijing.
Demographic issues are another case. China recognises that the eastern heartlands are densely populated by Han Chinese, while the minorities are numerically much fewer, live in less densely populated regions and might be particularly sensitive to policies that could reduce their numbers. For these reasons, the minority nationalities were not pressed to embrace the 'one child' policy that was applied to the majority population.
However, at a local level in Tibet and Xinjiang, what counts most is the influx of Han Chinese who come to live there. The newcomers see opportunities to earn a living; the locals see them as favoured pawns of a central policy intended to tighten Beijing's hold on their homelands.
The reform process that got under way in 1979 produced its own problems, including a crisis of expectations. The demands of development encouraged an increase in Han Chinese migration to some national minority areas. The economic benefits of reform were unevenly spread, being concentrated on the east coast - which was why those Uighur workers were in Guangzhou in the first place. Living standards rose for most in Xinjiang but, like the poor in the east, many Uighurs felt wronged by the increasing gap between their own position and that of the most advantaged.
Repression against traditional practices and religion lessened after the end of the Cultural Revolution, but this has led to a thirst for further change that the central government may be unwilling to contemplate, out of fear of a break-up of the country - a fear intensified by the Soviet experience.
Policy shortfall
While Mao Zedong and other leaders talked of opposing national hostility, with a stress on Han 'great nation chauvinism', there was a lack of specific initiatives on the educational level. Frictions between nationalities were regarded as being due primarily to the activities of the old oppressing classes, who set people against people for their own advantage: Under socialism, national oppression and hostility were expected to fade away as the country developed.
Although there have been many policy changes in China since Mao died, there is still a strong tendency to treat the nationality issue as if it is chiefly a matter of economic development - hence the descriptions of money invested and projects implemented that loom so large in China's defence of the status quo.
This is an instance in which China might gain by considering experience in the West, where minorities protesting against oppression and racism have often managed to make their voices heard. The results included cultural and literary expression, equal opportunities programmes, schemes to encourage understanding and dialogue between communities and a wealth of initiatives that a primarily economic approach to national problems leaves unexplored and untried.
When people turn on each other as they did last week in Xinjiang, killing and maiming them because they come from the other community, there is clearly something wrong that neither a clampdown nor spending more money will fix.
The author is a Singapore-based freelance writer.
Last week's violence shows there's clearly something wrong that neither a clampdown nor spending more money will fix
By JOHN GEE
THE violence in China's Xinjiang province has been damped down for now, but serious damage has been done. Blaming the troubles on outside interference was the predictable reaction of a government wrongfooted by events.
The immediate cause of last week's violence was the escalating response to an incident in Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong province, in which Uighur workers were alleged to have molested a Han Chinese woman.
But this begs the question of why relations between many Han and Uighur Chinese citizens should be in such a fragile state that a possible case of sexual harassment should lead to so much violence. The incident became a lightning rod for the expression of other discontents.
China was an empire for most of its history. The experiences of its non-Han Chinese peoples differed considerably. In the more outlying areas, including Tibet and Xinjiang, central government authority sat lightly for long periods of time; in return for a formal acceptance of imperial authority, Beijing was content to leave in place the local power structures, cultures and religious observances.
Closer to the imperial centres of power, some nationalities faced more heavy-handed treatment by the government and felt threatened by encroachments on their lands and livelihoods by Han Chinese arrivals.
When the Communist Party of China was established, its policy on the 'national question' in China followed that developed by Soviet communists. Their understanding of national oppression and how it should be countered had been crystalised as early as 1913 in Marxism and the National Question, an essay that established Joseph Stalin as the Bolsheviks' leading authority on the issue and, incidentally, defined nationhood in narrow Eurocentric terms as a feature of 'the epoch of rising capitalism'.
The Bolsheviks' official stand was that pre-revolutionary Russia was a 'prison house of nations', and it should be replaced by a voluntary union in which the people of all nationalities would be equal. A distinction was made between 'nations' and 'nationalities'.
Peoples such as the Ukrainians and the Kazakhs were held to have all the characteristics of nationhood, and this was acknowledged by establishing republics for them that, in theory, were voluntary member-states of the Soviet Union and could secede if they wished.
In reality, the Soviet Union was far more centrally controlled than its Tsarist predecessor. Only with the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s did it prove possible to exercise that right, and all the republics did so with alacrity.
Soviet experience
'Nationalities' were seen as being somewhat less than fully formed nations. Official policy towards them was that they should have a right to various degrees of autonomy, but not to secede from the republic within which they lived. Hence, they were given autonomous republics and regions. This has led to big complications since the break-up of the Soviet Union, with members of some nationalities (most notably, the Chechens) seeking to achieve independent status for their autonomous entity or unification with others of their nationality (as in the case of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabagh).
As far removed as this might seem from present-day China, it is directly relevant, as the Soviet experience not only informed Chinese communist policy making in the past, but the circumstances of the collapse of the Soviet Union are seen as a lesson in what should be avoided.
After the Chinese communists took power in 1949, they recognised over 50 different populations as nationalities, which they regarded as part of a larger Chinese nation. Extensive areas with a high concentration of a particular nationality - roughly 45 per cent of the country - were designated as autonomous regions: Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia and Guangxi. Some smaller autonomous units were also created.
Crucially, none of the minority peoples were regarded as nations with republican status on the Soviet model and a constitutional right (however constricted in practice) to secede from the Chinese state.
Foreign perceptions of China's nationalities policy have been largely moulded by the example of Tibet, but the record has been more mixed than that unhappy case might suggest. China can cite progress in the autonomous regions in health care, education and housing, investments in infrastructure and other indicators of progress. Also at times of greatest hardship, such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, people of all nationalities suffered, without discrimination. The problem here - and it has been a problem all along - is that the official approach is overwhelmingly defined in social and economic terms that take little account of attitudes and values.
Demographic issues
The treatment of religion is a case in point. While all religious groups came under various forms of pressure after 1949, the communist leadership saw Confucianism as having had a particularly harmful effect on China by inculcating submission to traditional authorities.
During the Cultural Revolution, there was even a 'campaign to criticise Lin Biao and Confucius'. So the belief system that had been most influential among China's majority population was certainly not treated favourably compared to the religions traditionally dominant among the minority nationalities, but that might not be what the minorities saw. What mattered to the religious among them was that their mosques and temples were attacked by Red Guards and that their values were denigrated: They often experienced things such as offences against their nationality, irrespective of the fact that they were not being specifically targeted by the leadership in Beijing.
Demographic issues are another case. China recognises that the eastern heartlands are densely populated by Han Chinese, while the minorities are numerically much fewer, live in less densely populated regions and might be particularly sensitive to policies that could reduce their numbers. For these reasons, the minority nationalities were not pressed to embrace the 'one child' policy that was applied to the majority population.
However, at a local level in Tibet and Xinjiang, what counts most is the influx of Han Chinese who come to live there. The newcomers see opportunities to earn a living; the locals see them as favoured pawns of a central policy intended to tighten Beijing's hold on their homelands.
The reform process that got under way in 1979 produced its own problems, including a crisis of expectations. The demands of development encouraged an increase in Han Chinese migration to some national minority areas. The economic benefits of reform were unevenly spread, being concentrated on the east coast - which was why those Uighur workers were in Guangzhou in the first place. Living standards rose for most in Xinjiang but, like the poor in the east, many Uighurs felt wronged by the increasing gap between their own position and that of the most advantaged.
Repression against traditional practices and religion lessened after the end of the Cultural Revolution, but this has led to a thirst for further change that the central government may be unwilling to contemplate, out of fear of a break-up of the country - a fear intensified by the Soviet experience.
Policy shortfall
While Mao Zedong and other leaders talked of opposing national hostility, with a stress on Han 'great nation chauvinism', there was a lack of specific initiatives on the educational level. Frictions between nationalities were regarded as being due primarily to the activities of the old oppressing classes, who set people against people for their own advantage: Under socialism, national oppression and hostility were expected to fade away as the country developed.
Although there have been many policy changes in China since Mao died, there is still a strong tendency to treat the nationality issue as if it is chiefly a matter of economic development - hence the descriptions of money invested and projects implemented that loom so large in China's defence of the status quo.
This is an instance in which China might gain by considering experience in the West, where minorities protesting against oppression and racism have often managed to make their voices heard. The results included cultural and literary expression, equal opportunities programmes, schemes to encourage understanding and dialogue between communities and a wealth of initiatives that a primarily economic approach to national problems leaves unexplored and untried.
When people turn on each other as they did last week in Xinjiang, killing and maiming them because they come from the other community, there is clearly something wrong that neither a clampdown nor spending more money will fix.
The author is a Singapore-based freelance writer.
Friday, June 26, 2009
Zhao Ziyang's ideas hold lesson for China leaders
Business Times - 26 Jun 2009By FRANK CHING
THE publication of the secretly recorded memoirs of former Chinese Communist Party leader Zhao Ziyang, who spent the last 16 years of his life under house arrest for opposing the crackdown on student protesters in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in 1989, provides a rare glimpse into how elite politics works in China.
The memoirs show that, as widely suspected, Deng Xiaoping was the one who decided to call in the troops even though he was formally not the head of state, of the party or even of the government. But he was the country's supreme leader, which reflected the abnormal state that the country was in at the time.
Mr Deng made an ineradicable contribution to China after he came to power following the death of Chairman Mao Zedong. Mr Mao had put his personal imprint on the country from the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 until his death in 1976.
Under Mr Mao, China supported revolutionary movements around the world and within China, there was one political campaign after another with millions of deaths. Mr Deng himself was purged twice by Mr Mao during the Cultural Revolution, and so had much time to meditate on what was keeping China backward at a time when other Asian societies were moving forward. And so, in 1978, he changed the country's course so that modernisation became the central task of the Communist Party.
Class struggle, like world revolution, was jettisoned. When the student demonstrations erupted in spring 1989, Mr Deng saw them as a threat to the party's monopoly on power. He did not hesitate to call in the troops to crush the peaceful protests. And when his right-hand man, 69-year-old Mr Zhao, refused to go along, Mr Deng got rid of him as well.
Mr Zhao was put under house arrest for the remainder of his life, until his death in January 2005. During this period of enforced idleness, Mr Zhao was able to ponder China's past, present and future.
Mr Deng, when sidelined by Mr Mao, developed a vision of China as a modern country under the control of the Communist Party. Mr Zhao, under house arrest, also thought long and hard about the country's future direction. Interestingly, his conclusion was diametrically opposed to that of Mr Deng. While Mr Deng wanted China to remain a one-party state, Mr Zhao concluded that China's only possible course was democracy.
In his secretly taped memoirs, Mr Zhao said that in 1989, when he was the party leader, he did not 'think that the Communist Party's ruling position should change'. However, he did think that 'the way it governed had to be changed' and, instead of 'rule by men', there should be 'rule of law'.
However, after years of contemplation, his position changed radically. 'The Western parliamentary democratic system', he decided, was superior to Communist Party rule. 'Almost all developed nations have adopted a parliamentary democracy,' he wrote. 'Why is there not even one developed nation practising any other system?'
If China does not adopt such a system, he argued, it would be faced with problems such as commercialisation of power, rampant corruption, and a society polarised between rich and poor. All this, of course, is contrary to Mr Deng's vision for China, which is shared by the country's current leaders. To them, a parliamentary system with checks and balances must be avoided at all costs.
But even if China's leaders today cannot accept Mr Zhao's ultimate conclusions, they can learn from some of his other ideas. Mr Zhao pointed out that the Chinese Constitution is good but the problem is 'there were no laws in place to support its implementation. That is why many of the citizens' rights defined in the Constitution could not be realised'.
That is an accurate description of the situation today. The Constitution, for example, declares in Article 35: 'Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration.' This sounds very good in principle; in practice, however, Chinese citizens do not enjoy such freedoms.
No laws have been enacted to implement these principles. Beijing has in recent years highlighted its support for human rights by putting into the Constitution a clause that says: 'The State respects and preserves human rights.'
However, saying it is one thing, putting it into practice is another. Legislation is needed to ensure that rights and freedoms stipulated in the Constitution are observed in real life.
If China's leaders are willing to accept this one idea from Mr Zhao, it would greatly improve the lot of the Chinese people.
The writer is a Hong Kong-based journalist and commentator
Saturday, June 13, 2009
MM seeks stable, long-term ties with Malaysia
The Straits Times - 13 June 2009
It makes no sense for bilateral ties to be sunny one day, stormy the next, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew said at an interview with Singapore journalists in Kuala Lumpur on Thursday. This is an edited transcript of his remarks.
MR LEE: This is my fourth day, we're off to Ipoh tonight. I leave Kuala Lumpur with some optimism, guarded optimism, because we have to see the words translated into action.
Prime Minister Najib said in Singapore that he wants cooperation with Singapore. He told the PM, let's work together. He repeated the same to me.
I had to emphasise that it cannot be cooperation today, non-cooperation next year and then back again, backwards and forwards, because these are very big investments both in the Iskandar region and the third bridge to Desaru and the east coast, from Desaru up to Mersing, up to Kuantan and Pekan, massive projects requiring huge investments, the returns can only be calculated in decades, not in terms of years.
So it must be a long-term commitment and it must mean cooperation across the board, not just selective cooperation where it's win for one side, less win for the other.
We either cooperate across the board and stay that way for decades or we revert to the old position where from time to time, we might work together, from time to time, we will not be working together. But no private investor will go into huge projects, which require decades to recoup, unless there's long-term stability in the policy.
The third bridge from Changi, it's for technical discussions. It does not make sense to us if at the same time, they punish us by making us barge sand from Vietnam. It's no benefit to them; it's just to cause us extra losses. So if it is cooperation, it must be across the board and the final balance must be fair on both sides and not just in specific, selective areas.
I was encouraged because I met the Deputy Prime Minister, Tan Sri Muhyiddin, and he repeated the same things, so obviously, the matter has been discussed in Cabinet and this was confirmed when I met the three vice-presidents (of Umno), Minister for Defence, Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Regional Development and they told me exactly the same.
In other words, Prime Minister Najib Razak had not only said this in Singapore, but had come back and briefed his Cabinet on his new policy. So as far as the Cabinet is concerned, they are solidly behind this policy, but as I said, if there are discordant voices, either from the states who may voice some reservations or from whatever high sources in Umno, then doubts will be cast in the minds of private investors.
The government will continue because we have promised an iconic project, we will carry on with that. But private investors do their long-term calculations; when they put these massive investments in, they need to be certain the policy will last decades.
Then we don't have to send our economic plants to Vietnam, to China, to India or to Batam, which we thought it wise to do because there were times when, whether it's rhetoric or otherwise, our investors felt they were not welcome.
When hiccups do occur, how should both sides react?
Mr Lee: My suggestion, which they have welcomed, is that there should be a lot of to-ing and fro-ing between the ministers and even the top officials, so even before hiccups reach the stage of third party notes, ministers can just pick up the phone, speak to each other and sort them out, which was the way it was done in the early years. But that generation, we went to the same schools, same colleges...so there was an easy relationship. Now we are separately educated.
Before, we used to have Malaya-Singapore Cambridge University Association or Oxford University, now we have two associations. So I suggest that both have joint celebrations, their national day, our national day, Hari Raya, Chinese New Year, Deepavali. In other words, let there be some bonding which will make the relationship easier.
Malaysia is our closest neighbour. Many Malay men have married Malay women from Singapore. Many Chinese have married men and women from Malaysia and they visit each other, so it does not make good sense to have this ambivalent relationship where one day, the weather is sunny, and the next day it's wet and flooding.
You spoke about guarded optimism. Is that how you feel also about the resolution of long-term bilateral issues?
Mr Lee: There are no longstanding bilateral issues which cannot be resolved. There were agreements and if there's any doubt over any agreement, it can go for third party adjudication, whether our interpretation of what has been agreed is right or their interpretation of what is agreed is right. There's no need to quarrel. As with the case of Pedra Branca, both went to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), resolved.
There are no legacy issues. These are firm agreements made between two parties, seriously intended, signed by both parties, knowing what its content meant. There's now a difference in when is the operational date etc, we can send it to third party adjudication, either the international arbitration court or the ICJ or even any of the renowned arbitration centres. The thing can be resolved. But if we start arguing and say that this is a legacy issue, forget about it, it is not resolved.
Given the results of last year's general election in Malaysia, would you say there is uncertainty on the political front? What's your reading, having met some of the opposition leaders?
Mr Lee: Everybody knows there's been a tectonic shift and the analysis has been that the urban Malays, especially the educated young Malays, voted this time for the opposition, together with the Chinese and Indians.
I met Hadi Awang (president of Parti Islam SeMalaysia or PAS). He told me, in Kelantan we are very fair to all races, the Chinese temples, Indian temples, Chinese are given ownership of land, so there's no discrimination. He believes that same policy can spread across Malaysia, not just in Kelantan.
That's left to be seen, what Umno does to win back Malay, Chinese and Indian support, which this time went to the other side.
Hadi Awang said in the countryside, rural Malays are not educated, therefore they still depend on the patronage of Umno, so they still stay loyal.
In the towns, they are now well educated, many engineers and professionals have joined and become members of PAS or Parti Keadilan Rakyat and he's said we're patient people, year by year, there'll be more and more people moving from countryside to towns. Therefore, more and more people will be educated and be sceptical and critical, so they are quite sure that time is on their side.
It really depends on how Umno and Barisan Nasional (BN) react. I do not believe they are going to stay put, because then as PM Najib has said, they're in for problems.
The opposition has made great inroads. Are you concerned about that and what are the implications for Singapore?
Mr Lee: If I'm not concerned, why should I be here? As I told you, it's a tectonic shift which (opposition coalition) Pakatan Rakyat did not expect, neither did BN, and both sides have done their analysis and come to the same conclusions.
The town Malays and town Chinese and Indians want more transparency, no double language and a more inclusive society. So Prime Minister Najib has said, 'One Malaysia'.
The Chinese press, whom I met separately, said they first reported it as one multi-racial Malaysia and then they were corrected to say One Malaysia, that is to say we share one Malaysia but the communities remain distinct, as Malays, Chinese, Indians. It's a different set-up.
Is this a trip down memory lane for you?
Mr Lee: In part, because I haven't been to Seremban for 40 years. I used to go there and practise in Seremban in the courts, so I had some nostalgia to see some of the places.
The Menteri Besar was happy to see me, arranged for a coach, personally escorted me. He'd also like us to carry our investments up from Malacca to Seremban.
Saturday, April 11, 2009
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF SINGAPORE’S FOREIGN POLICY: THEN AND NOW
SPEECH BY MR LEE KUAN YEW, MINISTER MENTOR, AT THE S. RAJARATNAM LECTURE, 09 APRIL 2009, 5:30 PM AT SHANGRI-LA HOTEL
Independence was thrust upon Singapore. The fundamentals of our foreign policy were forged during those vulnerable early years. They remain relevant because small countries have little power to alter the region, let alone the world. A small country must seek a maximum number of friends, while maintaining the freedom to be itself as a sovereign and independent nation. Both parts of the equation – a maximum number of friends and freedom to be ourselves - are equally important and inter-related.
Friendship, in international relations, is not a function of goodwill or personal affection. We must make ourselves relevant so that other countries have an interest in our continued survival and prosperity as a sovereign and independent nation. Singapore cannot take its relevance for granted. Small countries perform no vital or irreplaceable functions in the international system. Singapore has to continually reconstruct itself and keep its relevance to the world and to create political and economic space. This is the economic imperative for Singapore.
To achieve this, we have to be different from others in our neighbourhood and have a competitive edge. Because we have been able to do so, Singapore has risen over our geographical and resource constraints, and has been accepted as a serious player in regional and international fora. We earn our living by attracting foreign investments and producing goods and services useful to the world. Hence, we must always have the ability to be ourselves and be different from others in the wider region of East and South Asia. Had we disported ourselves like our better endowed neighbours, we would have failed. For Singapore, unlike others in our neighbourhood, is of no intrinsic interest to any developed country when they can invest in our larger neighbours endowed with more land, labour and natural resources.
At the same time, we must never delude ourselves that we are a part of the First World in Southeast Asia, a second and third world group of countries. Our region has its own special features. Singapore’s destiny would be very different if we were sited in Europe or North America. We cannot transplant our island elsewhere. Therefore, a recurrent issue for Singapore is how to differentiate ourselves from our neighbours in order to compete and survive, and also get along with them. This is a perennial foreign policy challenge.
The Changing International Environment
As the world changes, small countries have to swiftly adjust their policies and positions in a pragmatic and clinical manner. We have to live with the world as it is, not as we wish it should be. We must remain nimble to seize opportunities that come with changing circumstances, or to get out of harm’s way.
Let me outline the major changes in the international and regional environment since we became independent.
In 1965, the Cold War was at its height. The world was bipolar, divided into communist and non-communist blocs and a main fault line ran through Southeast Asia. The Vietnam War had been raging on for several years. That year, President Lyndon B Johnson upped the ante by bombing North Vietnam. All the non-communist countries of Southeast Asia faced serious internal threats from communist insurgencies or subversive movements supported by a China that was then in the throes of the launch of the Cultural Revolution.
All the non-communist countries of Southeast Asia were embroiled in disputes of varying intensity with one another. Singapore had just been “separated” from Malaysia and Indonesia was pursuing a policy of “konfrontasi” against Malaysia and Singapore. The Philippines claimed Sabah. Brunei with British help had suppressed an internal rebellion backed by Indonesia. There were also strong irredentist pressures on the borders between West Malaysia and Thailand, and between the Philippines and Indonesia. In these unpropitious circumstances, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed so that the non-communist states in Southeast Asia could contain and manage their differences to meet the greater threat from the communists.
The world has completely transformed. The Cold War is over after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Soviet Union imploded in 1991. Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia have joined ASEAN. The threat of mutual nuclear annihilation during the Cold War has gone.
But it is not the “end of history” that an American has written in the euphoria of triumphalism. The Cold War divided the world into two blocs for more than 40 years from the end of the Second World War. Two heavily armed nuclear blocs made it a dangerous world. Once this over-arching strategic discipline of the bipolar Cold War was dissolved, long submerged conflicts broke out in many parts of the world, but fortunately not in Southeast Asia.
With the collapse of the communist ideology of how society and the economy should be organised, all states joined the global wave of the free market.
Singapore has since 1965 plugged into the international economic grid. We welcomed Multi-National Companies (MNCs) to invest and manufacture in Singapore when the conventional wisdom was that MNCs exploit Third World countries. As an open economy, we took full advantage of globalisation.
East Asian countries had been leading the pack in this globalisation wave. They distinguished themselves from other Third World countries by single-minded emphasis on development. Japan was the earliest to plug itself into the global system. The Newly Industrialising Economies of Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan followed suit from the 1960s; then came the Southeast Asian ‘tigers’: Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. Vietnam reformed its economy in the 1990s.
The most dramatic transformations were China and India. China’s re-emergence in the world economy is the single most profound event of the 21st century. Two huge economies in China and India will reshape the world order before the end of the 21st century.
In the 1960s and 1970s, Singapore was berated in the Chinese media as a lackey of the American imperialists. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) backed by China refused to recognise Singapore’s independence. This changed after Deng Xiaoping visited Singapore in November 1978. It marked a dramatic change in Singapore’s relations with China, and also China’s relations with Southeast Asia. Deng visited Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur before he arrived in Singapore. He personally saw that China had fallen behind these supposedly backward cities. Also, he concluded that China had to stop supporting insurgencies in Southeast Asia if he wanted ASEAN to support the resistance to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia.
In 1985, Dr Goh Keng Swee retired as Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister. He was invited to be Economic Advisor to the State Council on the development of China’s coastal areas and tourism. China, a huge nation with an ancient history, was willing to learn from a tiny city-state.
Deng Xiaoping kept abreast of developments in Singapore and Southeast Asia. During a tour of southern China in February 1992, he said, “there is good social order in Singapore. They govern the place with discipline. We should draw from their experience, and do even better than them.” Vice Minister of Propaganda Xu Weicheng led a delegation to Singapore for 10 days that same year. Since then, exchanges between Singapore and China have grown. Hundreds of Chinese officials continue to be trained in Singapore. Since 1996, we have trained over 16,000 Chinese officials.
Rebalancing the world
The post-Cold War world is in a state of flux. All countries are transiting to a different global order.
The present unprecedented global economic crisis has resulted from a lack of checks on the many financial products called “derivatives”. There was insufficient oversight in international financial markets as layer upon layer of ever more complex financial instruments spun out of control. The world is suffering the consequences.
A mood for more regulations and control prevails in many economies. This could slide into protectionism. Protectionist measures to protect domestic employment will prolong the economic crisis with unpredictable geopolitical complications.
This crisis will hasten China’s growth vis-à-vis the US. It is growing at 8%; the US may suffer negative or low growth. China has proven itself to be pragmatic, resilient and adaptive. The Chinese have survived severe crises – the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution – few societies have been so stricken. These are reasons not to be pessimistic.
The relationship between the US and China has already become the most important geopolitical issue of this century. Both countries realise that they need to work with the other. Neither wants conflicts. Both have to reckon with internal pressures from serious problems of growing unemployment.
However, American resilience and creativity should never be underestimated.
As the dominant global power, preserving the status quo is in US interests. As a rising power, China will not acquiesce to a status quo status indefinitely. Competition is inevitable, but conflict is not.
The US and China will both come through the present economic crisis. China is closing in on the lead the US enjoys. Their relations will remain stable, provided the world does not slide into protectionism. Each has to accommodate the core interests of the other.
The world, including East Asia, is not yet “decoupled” from the US. Multi-polarity where different poles are approximately equal in strategic weight is unlikely to emerge because the “poles” are not equal. A global economic recovery is not possible unless the US recovers.
After the crisis, the US is most likely to remain at the top of every key index of national power for decades. It will remain the dominant global player for the next few decades. No major issue concerning international peace and stability can be resolved without US leadership, and no country or grouping can yet replace America as the dominant global power.
Europe can become an economic force. Because its members have not submerged their sovereign interests, the EU cannot be a global strategic actor. This crisis has shown how divergent the national interests of EU members are.
China, the EU, Russia, India will be independent players. China has made beachheads in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. It will be a global player in another three to four decades. China’s present preoccupations are domestic, and its relationships with the countries of North East and South East Asia.
Russia’s capabilities are limited. It wants to consolidate its influence in its “near abroad”. Japan will be distracted by domestic politics. India is an emerging power, but at present lacks a competitive industrial base. However, it is the dominant power in South Asia.
China will pull ahead of Europe, Japan, India and Russia. US-China relations are setting the framework for East Asia. In the latter 21st century, US-China relations will become the most important bilateral relationship in the world, like the US-USSR relationship during the Cold War.
The US needs support from its European, Japanese and other allies to deal with international issues. The West is less cohesive after the Cold War. On international issues, like climate change, conflicts in the Middle East, proliferation, terrorism, food and energy security, pandemics or promoting Third World development, the US is not assured of unanimous support.
The current financial and economic problems require a global rebalancing of consumption and savings: a change in economic relationships between the US and China. Both must change in their cultural habits and mindsets. The American consumers must spend within their means. The Chinese consumers must increase their domestic spending. This will be a difficult transition.
Globalisation cannot be reversed because the technologies that made globalisation inevitable cannot be uninvented. In fact, better and cheaper transportation and communications will further advance the forces of globalisation. Singapore has to embrace this reality and remain open to talent, capital, technology and immigrants to make up for our low birth rate (total fertility rate of 1.29) with around 35,000 babies each year.
Singapore’s Future
Singaporeans must always be prepared to maximise our opportunities and manage the challenges. In an era of increasing rapid and convenient transportation and communications, political leaders frequently meet each other at bilateral and multilateral summits; and they become comfortable to phone each other through secure lines. Ambassadors do not influence foreign policy so significantly. Sound foreign policy requires a prime minister and a foreign minister who are able to discern future trends in the international political, security and economic environment and position ourselves bilaterally or multilaterally to grasp the opportunities ahead of the others. Able foreign ministry officers and diplomats who give insightful recommendations based on dealing with their counterparts and assessments on the ground can greatly assist the Foreign Minister and his cabinet colleagues towards this end. But ultimately, it is the Prime Minister and other key ministers who decide on changes in policies. At face-to-face meetings over long hours they can sense each other’s thinking and leanings before their officials are privy to them. Hence, our foreign policy from 1965 was settled by the PM and his key ministers. A mediocre PM and cabinet will decline our standing with other countries and we will lose opportunities like the lead we enjoy in Free Trade Agreements or Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements with the US, Japan, China, India, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, and our close relations with the oil states of the Gulf.
ASEAN is now more robust than in 1967. It has been an exception among Third World regional organisations. ASEAN has avoided being bogged down in post-colonial rivalries and tensions, and has focused on development.
Several ASEAN countries are in political transitions, working towards more sustainable and durable systems. Political circumstances will determine ASEAN’s pace of progress. Placed between the giants of China and India, ASEAN countries have to combine their markets to compete and be relevant as a region. There is no other choice. ASEAN is also playing a major role in shaping a wider architecture of cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.
Conclusion
Let me return to the complexities of Singapore’s relations with our neighbours. The events that led to our independence are receding into history. These different complexities are not the result of historical baggage, but of basic differences in political and social systems. Baggage is something we can discard. Political and social systems we cannot change so easily.
Singapore is a multi-racial meritocracy. Our neighbours organise their societies on the supremacy of the indigenous peoples, Bumiputras in Malaysia and Pribumis in Indonesia. Though our neighbours have accepted us as a sovereign and independent nation, they have a tendency to externalise towards us their internal anxieties and angst against their own minorities. This is unlikely to go away.
Time has worn down many of the sharper edges in our relations with our immediate neighbours. A habit of working together in ASEAN has also helped. Singapore is now more established, internationally and regionally. Forty years ago, many did not believe Singapore would survive, let alone prosper.
We have a strong economy, accumulated robust reserves, developed a civil service of integrity and ability, a mature and capable foreign policy team, and institutionalised our systems.
We have strategic relationships with the major powers. We have a credible defence capability. The SAF is an insurance in an uncertain world.
Each successor generation of Singaporeans must build on these assets and work out their solutions to new problems, seize new opportunities and avoid impending disasters in an ever changing world. The perennial challenge is to remain competitive. To be competitive, we must remain a cohesive, multi-racial, multi-religious nation based on meritocracy. We have to strengthen our national consciousness at a time when the forces of globalisation are deconstructing the very notion of nationhood.
All countries face this challenge. A country like America has over 200 years of history to bond its citizens. We have only 40 years. But so long as the succeeding generations of Singaporeans do not forget the fundamentals of our vulnerabilities, and not delude themselves that we can behave as if our neighbours are Europeans or North Americans, and remain alert, cohesive and realistic, Singapore will survive and prosper.
Wednesday, December 31, 2008
Dr Mahathir's Blog
Go to this blog to read some interesting views of Malaysian politics.
http://www.chedet.co.cc/chedetblog/
http://www.chedet.co.cc/chedetblog/
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